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A Hierarchy of Markets:
How Basic Needs Induce a Market Failure
Shlomit Azgad-Tromer*
What makes some markets more vulnerable than others to price goug-
ing? This essay introduces an innovative framework for characteriza-
tion of markets, based on consumers' basic needs. Current contract law
is based on a binary model: contracts which lack consent are considered
void and are not enforceable under the unconscionability doctrine.
Current law does not make the distinction between essential and non-
essential markets. Consumers of luxuries and consumers of essentials
are considered equal, and receive similar legal protection under the con-
tractual framework of the consumer transaction. Yet, voluntariness is
not binary. Rather, voluntariness is a hierarchical continuum reflecting
human needs. Certain products are purchased because the consumer
has to have them, while other products are purchased as a discretionary
consumer choice.
This essay offers a theory for the hierarchy of markets. The essay
surveys the behavioral literature discussing human needs and the dis-
tinction between essentials and luxuries, and applies the needs-based
theory to consumption, creating a pyramid of markets following Mas-
low's hierarchy of needs. The essay identifies the determinants of mar-
ket essentiality, including a moral baseline of consumption; lack of
good substitutes and inability to decline purchase; and time constraints
creating difficulty to defer purchase. The continuum of market essen-
tiality is then demonstrated using four examples, including electricity
for heating, infant formula, broadband services, and a violin.
The essay argues that essential needs-based consumption induces a be-
havioral market failure, where consumers' decision-making process is
particularly vulnerable and distorts sellers' incentives towards a sub-
optimal equilibrium. Markets of essentials tend toward failure of de-
mand, due to consumers' bounded voluntariness and lower probability
of informed choice. Accordingly, sellers in markets of essentials have
higher incentives for collusion and lower incentives for price competi-
tion and for investment in product quality. Thus, the likelihood of mar-
* The essay has benefited from insightful discussions with Oren Bar-Gill and useful com-
ments by Itai Ater and Michael Trebilcock.
1
2 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1
ket failure increases with the essentiality of the product: the more basic
the underlying need, the higher the probability for market failure.
The difficulty of regulators to tell which markets are essential is ad-
dressed. The essay suggests two methods for assessment of essentiality -
the first, through political assessment, and the second, through analysis
of market data documenting elasticity of demand for popular product
categories. Low elasticity of demand for popular product categories is
proposed as a market signal for consumers' bounded voluntariness and
for product essentiality.
The normative implications of this structural division of markets are
discussed and initial policy guidelines suggested. Essentiality and its
tendency to create a behavioral market failure implies that consumer
law should be structured with a hierarchy of rights, similar to constitu-
tional law. Essential markets should be subject to a higher degree of
paternalism compared with markets of non-essentials.
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A HIERARCHY OF MARKETS
INTRODUCTION
What makes some markets more vulnerable than others to price
gouging? What makes consumers vulnerable to price gouging? And
what causes the astronomical price increases for prescription drugs?'
Is it profit-seeking villains, such as Mr. Shkreli, taking advantage of
the sick and helpless?2 We love to hate Mr. Shkreli, 3 but the truth is,
that it is neither Mr. Shkreli's sociopathic personality, nor his brash
manners that allow Turing to gouge its vulnerable patients. Mr. Sh-
kreli is not alone. Rather, a fundamental flaw in the law allows corpo-
rations to take advantage of consumers' basic needs. Mr. Shkreli was
maximizing shareholder value, as CEOs ought to do under corporate
law. Shkreli is simply playing by the rules to their bitter end. The
discrepancy between shareholders empowerment and patients vulner-
ability is reflected in many corporations of the pharmaceuticals
industry.
This essay introduces an innovative framework for consumer pro-
tection, based on consumers' basic needs. Current contract law is
based on a binary model: contracts which lack consent are considered
void and are not enforceable under the unconscionability doctrine.
Contracts which are consensual, are enforceable. Under this model,
patients receive no relief: obviously, they are better with the medicine
than without it. Yet, patients are not free not to choose their
medicine. They need to acquire it or suffer the consequences related
to their chances of survival and state of health. As many pharmaceuti-
cal companies understand well, patients in need of a life-saving
medicine are likely to pay all they have for the cure. Patients in this
position are similar to a person buying water in an isolated desert.
We are often bound to purchase in a particular market for the ful-
fillment of basic human needs. Such human needs as survival and
1. For an analysis of price increases in drugs during 2015, see Andrew Pollack and Sabrina
Tavernise, Valeant's Drug Price Enriches It, but Infuriates Patients and Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES
Oct. 4, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/business/valeants-drug-price-strat
egy-enriches-it-but-infuriates-patients-and-lawmakers.html?action=click&contentCollection=Pol
itics&module=MostPopularFB&version=Full&region=Marginalia&src=me&pgtype=article&_r
=0
2. Mr. Shkreli is the CEO of Turing Pharmaceuticals AG. In October 2015, Mr. Shkreli, a
CEO appointed by a hedge fund, raised the price of Turing's life-saving medicine, Daraprim, by
5000% overnight. He eventually scaled it back after two weeks. See Lydia Ramsey, 2 weeks after
controversial pharma CEO Martin Shkreli announced he would lower the price on Daraprim, it's
the exact same price, BUSINESS INSIDER, Oct. 7, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/martin-shk
reli-update-on-daraprim-price-2015-10
3. BBC news calls Mr. Shkreli "the most hated man in America." Who is Martin Shkreli - 'the
most hated man in America'?, BBC News, Oct. 25, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-ca
nada-34331761.
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safety are served and provided for by profit-seeking corporations. In
order to converge the discrepancy between public values and corpo-
rate law, this essay considers the problem as a market failure rather
than a contracting failure. Instead of using the doctrine of unconscio-
nability on a case-by-case basis to claim the agreement void, and have
the patients lose the medicine, framing the case as a market failure
allows the design of ex-ante regulations that would prevent the goug-
ing of the general public. Due to consumers' bounded voluntariness
and urgency of purchase, the likelihood of an informed choice is also
reduced. On the supply side, competition is less likely to assist the
consumers of essentials required for satisfaction of basic needs be-
cause the constant demand lowers the incentives for price competi-
tion. When the market size is determined by exogenous consumer
needs, price competition is less likely to increase the number of units
sold. Whereas in markets of non-essentials, price competition may en-
large the market by bringing in consumers of other markets. When a
monopolist provides a basic need, its market power is boundless;
whereas when a monopolist provides a non-essential service, consum-
ers may turn to other markets for their shopping.
Public policy should be adjusted to amend consumers' vulnerability.
Markets serving basic needs can be detected by an empirical analysis
of data measuring market-level elasticity of demand in popular cate-
gories. When elasticity of demand for popular product categories is
low, policy makers can tell when consumers feel they must shop in
that particular product market. If consumers have bounded voluntari-
ness, and the moral values of society support the assignment of the
market as serving a basic need, that market should be considered es-
sential and be regulated at a higher degree of paternalism. Indeed,
basic needs and their tendency to induce a behavioral market failure
imply that consumer protection should reflect the nature of the mar-
ket. Corporations providing basic needs to the public should have du-
ties toward the rest of us, not only for their shareholders. When we
are most vulnerable, we need stronger consumer protection.
This essay offers a theory of essential markets and their regulation.
The essay argues that essential needs-based consumption is creating
an enhanced "behavioral market failure," 4 where consumers' deci-
sion-making process is particularly vulnerable and inevitably distorts
sellers' incentives towards a sub-optimal equilibrium.
4. A term coined in the scholarship of Oren Bar-Gill. See generally OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUC-
TION BY CONTRACT (1st ed. 2012) and Oren Bar-Gill, Competition And Consumer Protection: A
Behavioral Economics Account, in THE PROS AND CONS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION (2012).
[Vol. 14:1
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In part I, the essay surveys empirical and theoretical literature of
consumer behavior, documenting essential needs-based consumption
and discussing the nature of needs and the reflection of the hierarchy
of human needs in consumption. The determinants of essentiality are
identified as including the moral baseline of human rights and consti-
tutional protection, the lack of sufficiently good substitutes, and the
inability to decline or defer purchase. To outline the variety of con-
sumer conditions, Part I analyzes four examples of voluntariness: a
purchase of electricity for heating; a purchase of infant formula; a
purchase of broadband services; and a purchase of a violin. The essay
argues that the essential needs-based consumption increases the
probability for a behavioral market failure. On the demand side, con-
sumers are more likely to manifest cognitive limitation and bounded
will power for products they must have. On the supply side, competi-
tion is less likely to reach an efficient equilibrium as the incentives for
collusion rise in essential markets and the incentives for price compe-
tition decrease.
In Part II, the essay explores two main methodologies for assessing
market essentiality. The first is an objective evaluation of essential
needs performed from a paternalistic viewpoint of a regulator. An
example of an objective evaluation of essentiality is in the European
doctrine of Services of General Interest.5 The second methodology
for assessment of essentiality, developed herein, is using market-based
heuristics of the patterns of consumers' demand. Low market-level
elasticity of demand for popular products points to circumstances cor-
related with essential needs-based consumption, which increase
probability for a behavioral market failure. Popular products pur-
chased under conditions of low market-level elasticity may thus be
considered essential.
In part III, the essay suggests policy guidelines for regulation of es-
sential markets. The normative implications of this structural division
of markets are vast. Essential markets are prone to creating a behav-
ioral market failure, and imply that consumer law should be struc-
tured with a hierarchy of rights, similar to constitutional law,6 where
essential markets are subject to a more intense consumer protection
5. See infra, Part II(A).
6. Minimum essential levels of rights to food, health, housing, and education reflect a "mini-
malist" rights strategy recognized by the United Nations and adopted by several regimes world-
wide. Joshua Cohen, Minimilaism about Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?, 12 J. POL.
PHIL. 190, 192 (2004); Brigit Toebes, The Right to Health, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 169, 172-76 (Asbjorn Eide, Catarina Krause & Allen Rosas eds., 2nd ed.
2001). Constitutional protection is also typically given to an internal layer of rights distinguished
in hierarchy and ranked higher than other rights and interests. Karin Lehmann, In Defense of the
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than other markets.7 Bounded voluntariness requires a higher degree
of consumer protection and justifies "harder" paternalism.8
PART I: ESSENTIAL NEEDS-BASED CONSUMPTION
Humans have a variety of needs fulfilled through consumption. A
need is a subjective feeling of personal requisite.9 Products are ob-
jects of need satisfaction. Consider a young consumer parent who
purchases infant formula and later on in the same day, purchases a
designer outfit for her baby. The consumer knows she can get other
(less expensive) outfit substitutes, and may be able to give her baby
other comparable gifts, perhaps from another product category, such
as a toy, or a book. But she has to buy the formula. The formula is
necessary for her baby's survival and adequate development. The
consumer purchases both the outfit and the formula, but her product
choice of the formula is very different from her product choice of the
designer outfit. On a scale of voluntariness, the consumer makes a
completely voluntary product choice when she buys the outfit. But
her choice is severely limited when she buys formula: her purchase of
some brand of infant formula is a requisite. The consumer is captured
in the infant formula market and her choice is limited to the brands
available therein. If we consider infant formula as a category of prod-
ucts, rather than a specific brand, her free choice is almost diminished.
It is in fact not the product at all that she chooses, but rather, her
baby's survival. The value underlying the consumer transaction in the
case of the designer outfit is freedom of choice. But in the transaction
for the infant formula, the underlying value is exogenous to market
assumptions. It is simply the value of life. On a continuum of volun-
tariness, essential needs-based consumption is on one side of the scale,
and luxury consumption is on the other.
Literature in behavioral economics distinguishes between necessary
and luxury items.10 For example, food, clothing, and medical care are
Constitutional Court: Litigating Economic and Social Rights and the Myth of the Minimum Core,
22 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 163, 165 (2006).
7. Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.
J., 1826, 1834-35 (2013) (discussing paternalism as a response to behavioral market failures). See
infra Part III.
8. Id. at 1858-61.
9. The Oxford Online Dictionaries define "need" as an "object required because it is essential
or very important rather than just desirable," http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/eng
lish/need (last visited Oct. 25, 2015)
10. Uzma Khan, Ravi Dhar & Klaus Wertenbroch, A Behavioral Decision Theoretic Perspec-
tive on Hedonic and Utilitarian Choice, in INSIDE CONSUMPTION: CONSUMER MOTIVES, GOALS,
AND DESIRES 144, 149 (S. Ratneshwar and David Glen Mick ed. 2005).
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life requisites, which relieve an unpleasant state of discomfort." On
the other hand, luxuries provide their consumers with the Latin liter-
ary meaning of excess: products purchased beyond those required, for
satisfaction of a "condition of abundance, pleasure, ease and com-
fort,"1 2 rather than a minimal core of regular life. The distinction be-
tween luxuries and necessities can also be framed as a distinction
based on the cost of substitutes. When we think a product is essen-
tially necessary, we usually conceive the price of alternatives as very
high and thus not accessible. For example, the consumer mother may
be able to nurse her baby as an alternative for the formula.
Feeding a baby is a matter of survival and may most likely be con-
sidered a universal need. But some products are considered necessary
due to cultural expectations. An American may feel she needs cereal
on her breakfast table, but a French may prefer a croissant. Con-
sumption is culture dependent. As Amartya Sen explains regarding
nutrition, "[p]eople have been known to survive with incredibly little
nutrition.... There is difficulty in drawing a line somewhere, and the
so-called 'minimum nutritional requirements' have an inherent arbi-
,trariness that goes beyond variations between groups and regions."13
Needs vary from one individual to another1 4 and also change under
different circumstances, locations, and settings. What's considered es-
sential thus changes from one culture to another, from one geographi-
cal location to another, and from one legal system to another. Some
cultures impose different requirements on their members. An essen-
tial in one culture may be a luxury in another, due to cultural habits,
values, and norms.' 5 The particulars of essentiality thus reflect a par-
ticular culture's values and its expectations and habits of living.1 6 Ge-
ographical location, too, determines much of our essential needs. The
weather conditions in Massachusetts make heating and suitable winter
11. Id. at 146; see generally C.J. BERRY, THE IDEA OF LUXURY: A CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORI-
CAL INVESTIGATION (1994).
12. Khan, supra note 10, at 146; see generally BERRY, supra note 11.
13. AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINEs: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRIVATION
12 (1982).
14. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir., 1965) (Danaher,
J., dissenting).
15. Even a survival based "basic needs" approach is subject to economic and social interpreta-
tion. A universal normality of life expectancy, mortality patterns and minimal housing and nutri-
tion is hard to define, and may require further scientific assessment of necessary commodities.
Katharine G. Young, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of
Content, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 113, 130 (2008).
16. The focus of life and survival hides this ambiguity as the expectations of human flourishing
and dignity are implemented. It is also not clear what the priority rank is of different biological
needs for different sectors, as for example, the medical expenses of the elderly population versus
those terminally ill. See id. at 131.
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clothing a requisite need for its residents during winter, whereas
weather conditions in Maui, Hawaii, are warm and pleasant year-
round, imposing no special requirements for local consumers. Yet, if
most consumers in a given society find themselves under circum-
stances of necessity, there is safe ground to consider that the purchase
of a given product is culturally essential.
One way offered in the literature to differentiate between necessi-
ties and luxuries is consumer motivation. Necessities are typically
purchased with a utilitarian goal, whereas luxuries are purchased for
hedonic pleasure.' 7 Utilitarian products are functional and instrumen-
tal objects of life. Examples cited include microwaves, detergents, or
personal computers.18 Hedonic products are "multisensory" and
"provide for experimental consumption, fun, pleasure and excite-
ment," with cited examples including "flowers, designer clothes, mu-
sic, sports cars, luxury watches, and chocolate." 19 Marketing
researchers have documented methods for manipulating consumer
motivation in order to influence consumers' shopping patterns into
the necessities rather than the luxuries category. For example, guilt-
reducing justifications increase the attractiveness of hedonic prod-
ucts, 2 0 and preferences for hedonic products are enhanced when the
purchase is tied to charity donations. 21
Due to the declining marginal utility of money, the fraction of our
needed product purchases is larger for the poor than for the wealthy.22
17. Bernard Dubois, Sandor Czellar & Gilles Laurent, Consumer Segments Based on Attitudes
Towards Luxury: Empirical Evidence from Twenty Countries, 16 MKTG. LETTERS 115, 118
(2005); Klaus-Peter Widemann, Nadine Hennings & Astrid Siebels, Value Based Segmentation of
Luxury Consumption Behavior, 26 PSYCHOL. & MKTG. 625, 626-31 (2009).
18. Khan et al., supra note 10, at 146, (citing Ravi Dhar & Klaus Wertenbroch, Consumer
Choice Between Hedonic and Utilatarian Goods, 37 J. MKTG. RES., 60 (2000); E.C. Hirschman &
M.B. Holbrook, Hedonic Consumption: Emerging Concepts, Methods and Propositions, 46 J.
MKTG. 92, 96 (1982); M. Strahilevitz & J.G. Myers, Donations to Charity as Purchase Incentives:
How Well They Work May Depend on What You Are Trying To Sell, 24 J. CONSUMER RES., 434,
436 (1998)).
19. Khan, supra note 10, at 146.
20. Ran Kivetz & Itamar Simonson, Earning the Right to Indulge: Effort as a Determinant of
Customer Preferences Towards Frequency Program Rewards, 39 J. MKT. RES., 155, 157 (2002).
21. Khan et al., supra note 10, at 148 (discussing the effectiveness of promised donations to
charity in promoting "practical necessities" (e.g., a box of laundry detergent) to their effective-
ness in promoting "frivolous luxuries" (e.g., a hot fudge sundae). The results suggest that charity
incentives are more effective in promoting frivolous products than in promoting practical
products.
22. Ryan T. Howell & Colleen J. Howell, The Relation of Economic Status to Subjective Well-
Being in Developing Countries: A Meta-Analysis, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL., 536, 538 (2008) (sug-
gesting that the declining marginal utility of money might be due to the fact that income influ-
ences subjective well-being primarily when it is associated with the fulfillment of basic physical
needs).
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The conceptual common denominator of society is reflected in the
minimal market basket most consumers purchase, regardless of their
income. For the poor, this minimal market basket takes most of their
income. 23 For the wealthy, it is merely a minimal core layer of con-
sumption. This consumption hierarchy reflects Abraham Maslow's hi-
erarchy of needs, where needs are ranked by their prominence, and
needs low in the hierarchy must be fulfilled before the higher need in
the hierarchy becomes salient.24
According to Maslow, the physiological human needs come first,
followed by needs of safety, of love, of esteem (recognition), and fi-
nally - of self-actualization. Maslow later added the need to know
and to understand, as well as aesthetic needs to the list.25 The logic of
Maslow's hierarchy of needs is defined by two principles. First, the
gratification/activation principle, where satisfaction of lower-order
needs leads to the activation of the next higher order need in the hier-
archy. Second, the deprivation/domination principle, under which the
most deficient need is the most important need.26 Both of Maslow's
principles apply to consumer products. The more essential products
are the more salient and their purchase is a requisite for purchase of
luxuries. We would book our ski vacation in Europe only after we
have secured the essential grocery shopping. Some products are re-
quired for the lower level of needs for human survival, whereas others
are required for the higher level needs for self-actualization.
Each of our purchases is reflecting a need in Maslow's hierarchy.
Thus, products may be organized in accordance to Maslow's hierar-
chy. For example, a violin player may purchase food, clothing, and
medical care to satisfy her physical needs as well as an expensive vio-
lin by an Italian artisan. Wealth implies how high we can get in the
realization of our consumption hierarchy. All consumers need the
lower level of physical needs consumption, including minimal nutri-
tion, shelter, and medical care. Fewer consumers may be able to af-
ford products required for their self-actualization, such as the
expensive violin.
Maslow's hierarchy to consumption may be used to define and sort
products on the scale between necessities and luxuries. Luxuries may
be defined as products purchased in order to satisfy higher order
23. See Bruce D. Meyer & James X. Sullivan, Identifying the Disadvantaged: Official Poverty,
Consumption Poverty, and the New Supplemental Poverty Measure, 26 J. EcON. PERSP. 111, 111
(2012) (reporting the methodological survey of how poverty is measured).
24. See Abraham H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOL. REV. 370 (1943).
25. See generally ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (2d ed. 1970).
26. W. Fred van Raaij & Kassaye Wandswossen, Motivation-Need Theories and Consumer
Behavior, 5 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES., 590, 591 (1978).
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needs, whereas necessities are products purchased for the more basic
human needs. What matters in assessment of essentiality is the con-
sumers' need of the product category rather than purchase of any par-
ticular brand. Within each category, some brands will be more
expensive than others and some brands are likely to be perceived as
more luxurious than others. Yet, because what we seek in defining
essentiality is the satisfaction of the lower level of the underlying
need, essentiality is a characteristic of categories rather than of
brands. Thus, a luxurious brand purchased for the satisfaction of a
basic need is still essential as it satisfies a lower level in the consump-
tion hierarchy.
The following is a diagram of Maslow's hierarchy applied on
consumption:
Pr Sel tion
0
0
0.
0c'i Love8 Broadband services, cellular phones
ILLUSTRATION 1: MASLOW'S HIERARCHY OF NEEDS27
AND PRODUCT ESSENTIALITY
What factors influence the essentiality of consumption? As all of
our consumption may be needs-based, a normative theory is required
to determine which needs are basic and which needs are discretionary.
This essay suggests such theory in the following. In subsection A, the
essay identifies three determinants of essentiality, including a moral
baseline of consumption; lack of good substitutes and inability to de-
cline purchase; and time constraints and difficulty to defer purchase.
27. Maslow, supra note 24 (drawing on Maslow's original 1943 paper). Examples of products
and illustrating arrows were added by the author.
[Vol. 14:1
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A. Determinants of Essentiality
(1) Moral Baseline of Consumption
Essential products are products which we would expect consumers
to purchase as a social moral baseline.28  If consumers failed to
purchase essential products under market conditions, we would feel
the market failed to promote consumers' minimal secured level of
welfare. Some products are essential for the minimal normative life
the state aims to promise its citizens. 29 The right to live as a human
being and the value of dignity evoke a minimal consumption basket
that must be purchased if these rights are to be given substance.3 0 Es-
sential products are the content of this minimal normative basket.
These are products which are purchased in the consumer products
market, and are requisites for fulfilling society's promise for protec-
tion of human rights under the constitutional or international human
rights regime.
The material dimensions of human rights often emerge in the dis-
course of social and economic rights, with the right to life serving as a
foundation for human rights in the economic realm.3 ' The Human
Rights Committee requires the satisfaction of "essential foodstuffs, of
essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the
most basic forms of education," 32 affirming the material aspects of
human rights discourse. Essential products may be those purchased
for the satisfaction of basic needs, morally defendable as "a minimum
condition for a bearable life,"33 or for a "decent chance at a reasona-
28. ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 207 (1987) (identifying three kinds of expectations: the
statistical, the phenomenological, and the moral. The statistical is based on calculated probabili-
ties and the phenomenological on subjective expectations from the future. The moral may or
may not coincide with these and is a normative judgment); see TREBILCOCK, infra note 61, at 79-
80.
29. This extends, at times, to the general public, including the wider consumers group.
30. S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 506 (S. Afr.) ("[lit is not life as a mere organic
matter that the [interim] constitution cherishes, but the right to human life: the right to live as a
human being, to be part of a broader community, to share in the experience of humanity.. .more
than existence - it is a right to be treated as a human being with dignity . . . "); Khousa v.
Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) at 530 (S. Afr.) ("basic necessities of life
[must be] accessible to all if it is to be a society in which human dignity, freedom and equality are
foundational").
31. See Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoorsamity v. State of West Bengal, (1996) 4 S.C.C. 37 (In-
dia) (demonstrating the right to emergency healthcare); see also Ahmedabad Mun. Corp. v. Na-
wab Khan Gulab Khan, (1996) Supp. 7 S.C.R. 548 (India) (demonstrating the right to shelter).
32. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Rep. on
the 5th Sess., Supp. No. 3, Annex III, 1 10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (1991).
33. Jeremy Waldron, Rights and Needs: The Myth of Disjunction, in LEGAL RIGHTS 87, 92
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1996) (suggesting an instrumental meaning).
112015]
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bly healthy and active life of more or less normal length." 34 Minimum
levels of each of the rights require the satisfaction of basic needs
amounting to survival and to life, as well as to personal security.35 In
several regimes, including Canada and the United States, the right to
life is the founding constitutional protection of citizens' welfare enti-
tlements.36 But while the principles of human rights may transform
into income standardization through rigorous standards of minimum
wage, there is no published attempt to classify consumer law based on
these moral foundations. The state may secure minimal income, but
consumers are left to decide how to spend it on their own under free
market terms. The law's eyes are shut from normative imposition of
values on the public's minimal market basket.
One reason for the divergence of moral values from consumer law
may be the state action doctrine. Minimum wages and welfare entitle-
ments are classic functions of the state, whereas consumption is com-
pletely within the realm of private law. The state action doctrine
carves out private law as a realm in which state action does not apply
and moral principles embedded within the constitution are deemed
irrelevant.37 The doctrine asserts the consumer products market as a
sphere within which individuals act without state involvement, or with
insufficient state involvement to constitute "state action." Without
state action, there is no constitutional commitment to values and par-
ties are left to negotiate their relationships freely. 38
The development of the state action doctrine may be significant for
a thorough understanding of the normative neutrality of consumer
protection laws. In the famous 19th century Civil Rights cases, state
action invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875, enforcing equal pro-
tection in the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment through a prohibi-
tion of discrimination by private bodies serving the public in
establishments known as "public accommodations." 39 Discrimination
in public accommodations manifested only "[i]ndividual invasion of
34. HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTs: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 23
(2d. ed. 1996).
35. Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights, Annual Report 1979-1980, OEA/Ser.L/V/
11.50, doc. 13 rev. 1, at 2 (1980), cited in, Young, supra note 16, at 128.
36. See Gosselin v. Quebec, [2002] S.C.R. 84, 429, 641 (Can.) (arguing that the right to life is
infringed by a large decrease of social security recipients under thirty); MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRU-
TAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1960-1973 37 (1993).
37. Developments in the Law: State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 1248, 1256 (2010).
38. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974).
39. Note: NFIB v. Sebelius and the Individualization of the State Action Doctrine, 127 HARV.
L. REV. 1174, 1177 (2014) (explaining that public accommodations included "inns, public con-
veyances on land or on water, theatres and other places of public amusement").
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individual rights," and thus constitutional protection did not apply.40
With the rise of legal realism during and after the New Deal41 and in
particular from 1927 to 1972, "the state action doctrine was at its least
restrictive." 4 2 During this period, the Court deployed the Constitu-
tion "as a sword as well as a shield," 43 finding state action in privately
administered electoral primaries, covenants on private property, pri-
vately owned company towns, private bus services, and private coffee
shops leased on governmental property.44 But from 1972, with Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,45 the Court reinvigorated the state action re-
quirement and the robust conception of private spheres. 46 During the
following years, the Court found only a few instances which amounted
to state action,47 and mostly found actions which fell short of such
constitutional protection within the private realm.48 In 2000, the
Court reasserted state action as a limit on Congress's Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement authority, holding that private acts of gen-
der violence insufficiently implicated the state to constitute state ac-
tion.49 Congress found an alternative source of authority through the
Commerce Clause, to which the state action doctrine did not apply.50
But recently, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebe-
lius,51 the Court held that the provision requiring anyone who failed
to purchase health insurance to make a payment to the federal gov-
ernment under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act52 ex-
ceeds Congress's authority to regulate commerce (while not its
40. Id.
41. Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF 66 (1996).
42. NFIB v. Sebelius, supra note 39, at 1178.
43. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977).
44. NFIB v. Sebelius, supra note 39, at 1178. See e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961) (coffee shop); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 484 (1953); Pub. Utils.
Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461-63 (1952) (private bus service); Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
I, 19-20 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663-64
(1944).
45. 407 U.S. 163, 176-79 (1972). In this case, black plaintiff challenged the refusal to serve him,
arguing that the state's granting of a liquor license constituted state action to which the Four-
teenth Amendment applied. The Court declined to find such action, holding that the state had
not acted in any constitutional way and that the Lodge is a private actor free of constitutional
obligations.
46. NFIB v. Sebelius, supra note 39, at 1180.
47. Id., cited in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S 922 (1982).
48. Id., cited in NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 181-82, 199 (1988); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149, 164-66 (1978); Hudgens v. NLRB, 242 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976); Jackson v. Metro.
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-52, 358-59 (1974).
49. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607, 625-27 (2000).
50. NFIB v. Sebelius, supra note 39, at 1182.
51. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
52. NFIB v. Sebelius, supra note 39, at 1174; see Pub. L. No. 111-48, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified in scattered versions of the U.S. Code).
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authority to tax), articulating an additional perquisite: activity. Up-
holding the Affordable Care Act under the Commerce Clause, 53 the
Supreme Court reasoned that the decision not to buy health insurance
was a decision not to act, whereas commerce derived from commercial
activity, without which it cannot exist. 54 Thus, Congress could not reg-
ulate the decision not to buy health insurance under the umbrella of
regulating commerce.5 5
Well into the 21st century, the law still divides the world into public
and private, and the latter includes no normative protection other
than the freedom to contract as a manifestation of the freedom of will.
Social values, constitutional commitment, and human rights discourse
apply only in the public realm as obligations imposed on the state.
However, the essential dichotomy between public and private proves
problematic, in particular when applied to the consumption of essen-
tial products. As Cass Sunstein argues, "state action is always pre-
sent" 56 because the free market against which the freedom of choice is
asserted is also a mechanism provided by the State.57 The state always
decides whether to regulate or not, whether to intervene in the private
realm and protect a child from his abusive father or to shut its eyes
from the misery present behind the door.58 Yet, consumption of es-
sential products is not behind the private door; it is a frequent and
banal behavior forming the pattern of consumers' daily lives as institu-
tionalized by the state. Consumers shop for essential products in
stores located in the public sphere, typically provided by national or
multinational corporations, setting the shopping scenery quite similar
for most of the public nationwide. Privacy has nothing to do with con-
sumption of essential products. In the reality of 21st century con-
sumption, when the state places power on or enables nominally
private parties by delegating to a few powerful corporations the au-
thority to perform the public function of providing essential needs,
"the dividing line between private action and public action becomes
harder to define." 59
53. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2585-94 (Roberts, C.J.); 2644-50 (dissenting opinion).
54. Id. at 2585.
55. Id. at 2586, 2591 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
56. Cass R. Sunstein, Essay: Comparative Constitutionalism: State Action is Always Present, 3
CHI. J. INT'L L. 465, 466 (2002); CASs R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 160-61 (1993);
Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote On Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1296, 1301 (1982).
57. Brest, supra note 56, at 1301.
58. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 194, 212 (1989) (stating
that "oppression can result when a State undertakes a vital duty [e.g., child services] and then
ignores it").
59. Developments in the Law, supra note 37, at 1279.
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To summarize, seeking the moral baseline for determining the par-
ticulars of the essential market basket of consumer law may be guided
by the moral baseline of society in general, as determined by human
rights discourse, by constitutional protection and by other legal princi-
ples governing the legal system. Some material purchases are re-
quired for the consumer to reach the minimal level of life that would
be dignified with the protected values of her nation. In other words,
there is no way to obtain protection of rights without consumption.
Applying the state action doctrine on consumption of essential goods
thus denies the constitutional state's promise of liberty from
consumers.
(2) Lack of Sufficiently Good Substitutes and Inability
to Decline Purchase
Consumers of essential products are typically not free to decline
purchases, that is, declining the purchase may result in ferocious cir-
cumstances and has significant long-term costs. The consumer of es-
sentials is captive to consumption of the product's category. Essential
products tend to have insufficient good substitutes. Consumers are
captive in markets of essential products and may not switch to a dif-
ferent market for their shopping. Consider for example, the infant
whose mother is unable to breastfeed: the implication of a caregiver's
failure to purchase the infant formula would be severe neurological
and developmental damage.60 Parents must shop at the infant
formula market unless they are breastfeeding full-board, assuming
survival is a requisite. But parents looking to bring their infant to self-
actualization may shop for books, for toys, or for developmental clas-
ses. The ability to substitute with a product of another category is a
sign of non-essentiality.
Inability to decline purchase is often biological, but it is significant
to note that assessment of the ability to turn down purchase is also
based on moral and cultural expectations. For example, a person ad-
dicted to smoking may have a biological hurdle in declining or defer-
ring purchase of cigarettes. Yet, our cultural expectations would place
responsibility on the smoking individual and assume that her will
power should be strong enough to overcome the need to smoke, de-
spite the biological difficulty underlying the addiction. Voluntariness
may have boundaries due to cultural and social expectations, as well
as due to external circumstances, such as weather conditions or a war.
60. The Committee on Nutrition of the American Academy of Pediatrics discourages the use
of cow's milk under one year of age. Alvin M. Mauer et al., The Use of Whole Cow's Milk in
Infancy, 72 PEDIATRICs 253 (1983).
2015] 15
16 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL
The discussion of essentiality is at the market level, rather than the
brand level. It is the market level we seek to characterize as essential
or non-essential. Essential markets offer product categories that are
requisite to consumers and consumers feel they need, indeed, have to
purchase. The consumer situation in the essential products market is
enhanced by lack of competition, but is established on the prerequisite
subjective condition of necessity of purchase within the particular
market, regardless of the number of available competing brands
within.
(3) Time Constraints and Difficulty to Defer Purchase
Purchase of essentials is often constrained in time and is unlikely to
be deferred. Consumers must have their basic needs satisfied on time.
Returning to the running example, a thirsty infant must have her
formula promptly purchased and prepared. The biological or geo-
graphical circumstances of consumers make a particular consumption
essential at a particular place and time. Both the difficulty in defer-
ring purchase and the inability to decline purchase experienced by a
wide public suggest essentiality of the product or service purchased.
A good example of a time-constraint essential product category is
shovels purchased after a snowstorm. Empirical research documented
survey responses to the hypothetical: "A hardware store has been sell-
ing snow shovels for $15. The morning after a large snowstorm, the
store raises the price to $20. Please rate this action as Completely Fair,
Acceptable, Unfair, Very Unfair." 61 The reported results are that
eighty-two percent of respondents rated the action as unfair or very
unfair.62 Because consumers' voluntariness is restricted due to the
weather conditions, consumers are not free to decline or defer
purchase of the snow shovels at the updated price. Rather than com-
paring the price of shovels, consumers are likely to get their shovel at
the closest local hardware store. The updated shovels' price after the
snowstorm may be a response to the increase of demand, but it may
also be a response to the limitation of consumers' voluntariness and
their desperate need of a shovel at this particular time and place and
hence the unfairness public judgment. During the storm, the hard-
ware store assumes the role of a "situational monopoly;" "the fortui-
tous circumstances surrounding the interaction between the particular
parties to the exchange . . . create a monopoly power that [it]. . . op-
61. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit-
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 728, 729 (1986); see MICHAEL J. TREBIL-
COCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 89 (1997).
62. Kahneman et al., supra note 61, at 729; see TREBILCOCK, supra note 61, at 89.
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portunistically exploits in return for a quid pro quo that has no or
negative social value." 6 3 Bounded voluntariness of consumers affects
the transaction price beyond scarcity of supply.
Significantly, the inability to decline or difficulty to defer a purchase
tests yield a potentially different and wider circle of products as essen-
tial, compared with the application of human rights as a moral base-
line for assessment of essentiality. Consumers have no human right
securing their interest in the purchase of a snow shovel, but are
obliged to purchase the shovel at the particular time and place of a
snowstorm, and are morally frustrated by the market's imposition of
justice in cases of exploitation of their restricted voluntary will.64
B. Four Examples of Essentiality
Which products are considered essential by consumers? Consider
the following four examples for consumer products, entailing several
significantly distinctive normative dimensions: electricity for heating;
infant formula; broadband services; and a violin. This essay presents
the four examples briefly and then discusses the consumer situations
described.
(1) Electricity for Heating
The first example is electricity. The consumer in our example lives
in an area where the winter conditions are harsh and temperatures
frequently fall below 30 degrees Fahrenheit. The consumer lives in an
apartment with only one method of heating available and it is electric-
ity-based. Installing alternative heating methods is very expensive
and thus the consumer needs to use electricity in order to keep her
apartment warm enough to survive the winter. There is only one elec-
tricity provider operating in her geographical area.
But the electricity provider is not similar to other monopolies; it is a
monopoly acting in an essential market. Monopolies are a well-
known market failure, but it is significant to note whether the monop-
olist provider is acting in an essential or non-essential market. A mo-
nopoly of diamonds, for example, is likely to create market-failure in
the supply of diamonds. Yet, consumers may switch to purchase jew-
elry with pearls or avoid purchase of precious stones altogether.
When a monopoly is acting in an essential market, consumers are
bound to purchase at the monopolist price. The underlying value of
purchase of electricity for heating is survival, which is an established
63. TREBILCOCK, supra note 61, at 93.
64. Id.
2015] 17
18 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL
human right.65 To sustain her life, the electricity consumer has little
variety to choose from. There is only one electricity provider in her
area and her apartment has only one heating meth available. She can-
not defer purchase because it is freezing outside. There are really
only bad substitutes. So, her choice is binary: she may choose to stay
cold and potentially suffer from health and survival problems, or she
may choose to turn on the heat.
(2) Infant Formula
Milk for feeding a baby has to contain a particular nutritional com-
position, which may be provided solely by a mother's milk or by infant
formula. Infants are not able to survive on any other nutrition; infants
drinking water or cow's milk were shown to suffer significant develop-
mental defects. 66 Mothers are thus strongly encouraged to breastfeed
their babies for at least the first year of their lives and, in some parts
of the world, including Europe, longer, into the toddler years. How-
ever, some mothers may face limitations in full-board breastfeeding,
due to physical limitations or, by necessity or by choice, extracurricu-
lar motherhood activities, such as a demanding career. In addition, in
our society, many babies are born into families with only male par-
ents. While in previous centuries, only babies who were breastfed sur-
vived, starting in the 20th century infant formula was developed and
proven to provide a manufactured simulation of human milk.6 7 Con-
sumers in 2015 may walk into supermarkets and find several compet-
ing brands offering a substitute sufficiently close to breast milk for
their infants' developmental thriving.
65. The right to life has been extended in application to preventive health and food contexts,
as the Human Rights Committee required adoption of positive measures to protect life through
the elimination of disease epidemics and malnutrition. International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (A), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/2200, at 50-51 (Dec. 16,
1966); Human Rights Treaty art. 6, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171), cited in Secretariat, Compi-
lation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty
Bodies, at 127, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.6 (2003). The Comment at ¶ 5 stated:
The Committee has noted that the right to life has been too often narrowly interpreted.
The expression "inherent right to life" cannot properly be understood in a restrictive
manner, and the protection of this right requires that States adopt positive measures. In
this connection, the Committee considers that it would be desirable for States parties to
take all possible measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life expectancy,
especially in adopting measures to eliminate malnutrition and epidemics.
66. Mauer et al., supra note 60, at 253-54.
67. Wikipedia on "infant formula":
The U.S. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act defines infant formula as "a food
which purports to be or is represented for special dietary use solely as a food for infants
by reason of its simulation of human milk or its suitability as a complete or partial
substitute for human milk."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wikillnfantformula.
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The tremendous scientific achievement of developing infant
formula has surely changed human lives and saved many. The con-
sumer is able to bottle-feed his baby even when her mother is away.
By putting infant formula on the supermarket's shelves, the formula
provider expanded possibilities for consumers without derogating
them.68 Other societies may have allocated the necessary infant
formula in different methods, but market-based allocation is perhaps
the most efficient method of offering a range of options and synchro-
nizing the demand with the scarce supply. Having several competing
brands for a product simulating a mother's milk is a great achievement
of our markets.
What makes the transaction for infant formula special is the under-
lying consumer motivation. The consumer purchases the formula for
her baby to survive. As in the electricity for heating example, the
value underlying the transaction is beyond autonomous consumer
choice that serves as the foundational logic of consumer product mar-
kets. Rather, the value underlying the consumer transaction is human
survival, a recognized and well-established human right. Human
rights treaty bodies state that states should "adopt positive measures
[and] take all possible measures to reduce infant mortality and to in-
crease life expectancy, especially in adopting measures to eliminate
malnutrition and epidemics." 69 As a normative base-line, we would
expect the parent to purchase infant formula. Failure to purchase it
would violate the infant's human right, which we expect the state to
protect.
It is also significant to note the commercial implication of the con-
sumer parent condition. When the consumer enters the supermarket
to buy infant formula, the seller knows she is likely to choose some
formula from the options on the shelves, whatever those are. The
consumer is not likely to return home and decline, or even defer,
purchase. Unlike the consumer of the designer baby outfit who may
walk out of the designer store and pick a toy or a book instead, the
consumer of infant formula is unlikely to return home without it. Her
baby is thirsty.
68. Under a Nozickian rights-based theory, the distinction between threats and offers suggests
a moral foundation for contractual enforcement. When a proposal increases possibilities open to
the offeree relative to the precontractual period, we may say that the proposal is an offer, and
vice versa. See TREBILOCK, supra note 61, at 79 (discussing Robert Nozick, "Coercion," in Sidney
Morgenbesser, et al. eds., Philosophy, Science and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, 440-
72 (1969)).
69. See Young, supra note 15, at 129 n.82.
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(3) Broadband Services
The third example is broadband services. In this example, our con-
sumer lives in Northern America. There is only one broadband ser-
vice provider in her area. The consumer frequently needs to respond
to emails from her employer and her clients beyond her work hours,
which is difficult to do from her cellular network connection due to
the slow download of large files she needs to respond to. The con-
sumer also uses the broadband connection to keep in touch with her
friends as well as read and respond to their updates in the social media
website she is connected to. Broadband services are necessary for
both her social integration and her career.
(4) Violin
The fourth consumer plays the violin. She does many things during
her day, but playing the violin really makes her feel there is no other
place she would rather be. When she plays the violin, she feels her
talent reaches its peak. The consumer can use the violin at the music
school where she teaches, but she really wants to play in the evenings
and weekends. She prefers to have her own private instrument. She
saves money from her wages and purchases a hand-made violin from
an Italian seller. The new violin enhances the beauty of the music she
makes.
(5) Discussion
All four purchases are Pareto efficient: 70 all four consumers are bet-
ter off with the purchased product than they were before the transac-
tion occurred. Indeed, life would be unbearable for the four
consumers without these purchases. Under a Paretian analysis, the
four transactions benefit both parties to the consumer contract. There
is no doubt that the four transactions expanded the consumers' availa-
ble options, offering them a significant improvement in quality of life.
All four transactions should be enforceable. But there are still some
significant differences between the four consumer transactions.
The first two examples describe product choices under life-threaten-
ing situations. The consumer of infant formula and the consumer of
electricity for heating would be endangering their baby's life or their
own life if they decline or defer purchase. Theoretically, the con-
70. "A state of allocation of resources in which it is impossible to make any one individual
better off without making at least one individual worse off." When a contract is Pareto efficient,
both parties are maximizing their utility. See Wikipedia on "Pareto efficiency," https://en.wiki
pedia.org/wikilPareto-efficiency.
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sumer transaction for infant formula and for electricity is analogous to
the example Trebilcock gives for exploitation but not creation of life-
threatening risks: a tug taking a foundering ship and its crew in tow. 71
In Trebilcock's example, the rescue is done for an agreed, but extor-
tionate, salvage fee that vastly exceeds the competitive value of the
services entailed.72 But even before we look at the transaction price,
we can see that the consumers of life-preserving products and the
crew of the foundering ship are in a similar human condition. Price
and quality of service are of secondary importance to them. Indeed,
they have little meaning without sustaining their life first. Like the
consumer of electricity, the crew is likely to pay any price for the tug
and is not likely to negotiate better service. They must simply make
the transaction happen promptly, as must the consumer of electricity
who turns on the heat.
The significant difference between the first two examples is that the
consumer who purchases heat from the sole electricity supplier in her
area is analogous to the crew rescued by the solitary tug ship, whereas
the consumer of infant formula has several rescuing ships competing
to give it the tug service, but the competition is taking place in a
closed market where all suppliers know that the size of the pie is pre-
determined. Transaction with one of them is bound to happen soon.
Sellers know that consumers are captive who must purchase at their
market and will pay any price to a monopoly or an oligopoly. Given
the bounded voluntariness, the sellers' incentives to collude arise.
Compared with sellers of non-essential products who may attract
more buyers and enlarge their markets by price competition, sellers of
essential products face a constant market size. Competing on price in
an essential market is less likely because any price reduction would
only give the seller a larger share of the same size of the pie. In equi-
librium, other sellers would respond in price reductions of their own
leading to the ultimate expected outcome, which would lower sellers'
revenues.
As a product category, both infant formula and electricity for heat-
ing are purchases that consumers must make and in both the underly-
ing value is human survival, a well-established human right. Sellers of
both the infant formula and the electricity for heat are analogous to
an owner of a clean water spring in an oasis. According to Hayek, a
threat to withhold a resource that is crucial for consumers' existence
71. TREBILCOCK, supra note 61, at 85-86.
72. Id.
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should be considered coercive.73 Yet, considering long term policy ef-
fects, restricting the enforceability of these Pareto-efficient transac-
tions may reduce consumer welfare. For example, we have many
good reasons to encourage scientific endeavors, which may come to
fruition and result in infant formula. Declaring the purchase of infant
formula or the purchase of heating electricity unenforceable would be
disastrous in terms of long term consumer welfare because it might
deter ex-ante development efforts for products consumers may really
need. Incentives for development and provision of life-preserving
products and services should be strongly encouraged. As Trebilcock
puts it, "we are dealing with a problem of market failure, not con-
tracting failure, and the normative reference point is appropriately a
consumer or total welfare standard, not coercion or voluntariness in
exchange." 74
The third example of the consumer who purchases broadband ser-
vices from a sole supplier operating in her neighborhood is materially
different. The consumer feels that she needs the broadband services
for her work and for social integration. However, these are not inter-
ests protected by established human rights. The consumer strongly
prefers to make the purchase, but she does not have to make it. Yet,
the consumer has limited freedom of choice in declining to purchase
the broadband services. In her cultural setting, it would be bizarre not
to be connected. If she chose not to connect, it might harm her work
relationships with her employer and her clients. Declining the
purchase of broadband services is also likely to harm her social be-
longing to her community and friends who share experiences with
each other through the social media. She really cannot afford to stay
disconnected. Price and quality of the broadband service are again
secondary to the underlying interest motivating the transaction. She
decides to do with whatever everybody else does and she is not alone
in this consumer choice. Everybody she knows checks emails during
the evening and visits their favorite websites daily. Broadband ser-
vices are a prerequisite to a common habit of her culture. Subscribing
to the service is simply an adherence to cultural expectations, rather
than an exercise of free choice.
In the fourth example, the consumer makes a deliberate choice to
purchase the violin. She can definitely do without the new instrument,
but the purchase adds value to her satisfaction and contributes to her
need of self-actualization. Her choice of the particular unique hand-
73. F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 135-36 (1980); see TREBILCOCK, supra note
61, at 79.
74. TREBILCOCK, supra note 61, at 96.
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made violin brings together the instrumental, representative and sym-
bolic values of choice.75 This particular violin is exactly what she will
enjoy playing and it manifests her music miraculously. The consumer
spends a considerable amount of time researching her options before
she makes a purchase. The quality and price of the violin are central
to her ultimate choice. The market functions at its best.
Notably, the purchase of broadband services would not be consid-
ered essential under the human rights approach because we do not
have human rights protection for social integration. But due to cul-
tural expectations and social boundaries of choice, we are not able to
freely decline purchase of broadband services Thus, broadband ser-
vices may be considered essential under the inability to decline test as
a normative assessment of essential products.
Here is a table summarizing these four examples:
Electricity Infant Broadband
for Heat formula Services Violin
Freedom
not to X X X /
Moral Baseline purchase
Human
Rights / / X X
protection
Underlying Need Survival Survival Social Self-Integration Actualization
C. A Behavioral Market Failure
In the following, I argue that markets of essential products, charac-
terized by the determinants discussed above, are prone to failure. In
other words, the likelihood of market failure and the magnitude of
failure increase with the essentiality of the product; the more basic the
underlying need, the higher the probability for market failure and the
higher the magnitude of failure. This phenomenon occurs due to the
combined effects of both demand and supply in markets of essential
products as discussed below.
75. T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE To EACH OTHER 251-56 (2000). Scanlon identifies three
reasons we have to value free choice. First, instrumentality of choice. Probabilities of achieving
satisfaction are potentially greater if the consumer chooses the product for herself rather than
receives it as a result of a choice made by another or by a random selection process. Freedom of
consumer choice is instrumental because it enhances future consumer satisfaction and contrib-
utes to maximization of diverse consumer tastes and objectives. Second, the representative value
of choice, value arising when features of the consumer's self are manifested and reflected in the
product chosen. Third, the symbolic value of choice. It is manifested every time a person
purchases a product that reflects on and contributes to her perceived self-identity.
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(1) Failure of Demand
To achieve efficiency, markets must engage rational agents who re-
spond to changes in price and in quality. They are able to rank out-
comes from least preferred to most preferred. 76 Markets tend towards
inefficiency when there is a failure in voluntariness underlying the
transactions within and when information asymmetries between par-
ties to an exchange impede its voluntariness.77 "Dire constraints de-
stroy freedom of action" and contracts formed under threats are
unenforceable under doctrines of duress and of necessity.78 For this
reason, our legal system finds it unthinkable to enforce a contract
signed with a gun directed at the promisee's head. Contracts signed
out of necessity are likewise not enforced. "[A] surgeon runs out of
gas on a lonely desert road where she might perish. A passerby offers
to sell her five liters of gas for $50,000. Even if the surgeon accepts the
offer, the court will not enforce her promise to pay... because it was
given out of necessity." 79
The circumstances of consumers of essential products are analogous
to those of the surgeon in Cooter and Ulen's example above. Con-
sider the consumer who needs electricity for heating her apartment.
Like the surgeon, she needs the electricity for fulfilling her human
right to survival. As in the purchase of fuel in the isolated desert,
there are no real substitutes for the purchase of electricity because
replacing the apartment's heating technology is unaffordable. Be-
cause winter comes in specific times of the year, the electricity con-
sumer cannot defer the purchase. Like the surgeon in the desert, she
needs the product in a particular time and place. Both cases exem-
plify the same binary choice between survival and purchase, on the
one hand, and the lack thereof, on the other. The purchase of essen-
tial products by consumers is motivated by a value exogenous to the
logic of the markets - the desire to survive, to live, or to provide simi-
lar values to those whom they love.
Both the surgeon and the electricity consumer have only one sup-
plier for their essential product. Yet, their situation is very much simi-
lar to the consumer of infant formula, who is captive in the infant
formula market and must purchase formula for her baby to survive.
The difference outlined in the formula example is that the parent con-
sumer has several brands of formula to pick from. Indeed, if devel-
oped, efficient competition between the various formula brands may
76. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS, 225-33 (5th ed. 2007).
77. Id. at 46.
78. Id. at 225.
79. Id. at 226.
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reduce the formula price. Yet, as discussed in sub-section (2) below,
competition in an essential market is less likely to reach efficient equi-
librium. 8 0 Focusing on the demand side, the parent consumer, exactly
like the electricity consumer who turns on the heat, or the surgeon
shopping for fuel in the desert, must get the product in order to attain
a higher order value and thus experiences bounded voluntariness.
The failure of free voluntary will is enhanced by increased
probability for biased and uninformed consumer choice, due to the
effect of time constraints and necessity on purchase of essential prod-
ucts. Empirical research suggests that for products purchased under
time constraints, it is less likely that consumers have systematically
processed the applicable product information.81 Because shopping for
essentials is timely and task-oriented, the likelihood for subliminal,
automatic, and immediate "mindless" choice of products is higher for
essential, needs-based consumption than consumption of luxuries,
which is more likely to be a deliberate and conscious choice. 82 When
a product meets an essential physical or emotional need, consumers
80. See infra Part I (C)(2).
81. Rajneesh Suri & Kent B. Monroe, The Effects of Time Constraints on Consumers' Judg-
ments of Prices and Products, 30 J. CONSUMER REs. 92, 101 (2003).
82. The autonomous consumer, who makes her decisions by processing product information
and comparing pros and cons for alternatives, is often replaced by an impulsive "mindless" con-
sumer whose consumption habits are driven by unconscious, automatically-activated attitudes.
A key concept that requires deliberation here is that of autonomy. Since both System 1 and
System 2 decisions stem from the same subject, it is philosophically important to justify our
preference for one over the other. One way to define autonomy is as a relationship between
individuals' actions and their preferences, and between individuals' preferences and their selves.
Autonomy is defined here as a consistency between one's self (as accorded by her desired prefer-
ences) and one's behavior. Note that the underlying assumption here is that the set of prefer-
ences is separate from the "self" Essentially, this view defines autonomy as consistency between
two layers of the "self": the core self and a set of preferences that is presumably detached from
that core. This assumption was severely criticized as artificial and far-fetched. See Susan Wolf,
Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility, in Responsibility, Character and the Emotions 46
(FERDINAND SCHOEMAN ED., 1987). On mindless choosing, see generally BRIAN WANSINK, MIN-
DLEss EATING: WHY WE EAT MORE THAN WE THINK (2006). This is true for most consumers,
even if some sophisticated consumers may be able to overcome this human tendency and negoti-
ate contractual devices that would overcome this problem. DellaVigna and Malmendier show
that sophisticated consumers demand commitment devices to increase their consumption of in-
vestment goods (e.g., health club). Sellers supply these devices in the form of low per-usage
prices. Nalve users overestimate their future self-control and therefore their usage of the invest-
ment goods. The firm offers a contract with a discount on the per-usage price and a higher flat
fee, since the individuals overestimate the value of the discount. See Stefano Della Vigna &
Ulrike Malmendier, Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence, 119 Q. J. ECON.
353, 353 (2004). As the group of sophisticated consumers may not be significant enough to
correct the market failure for the general public (including the group of naive consumers), the
sophisticated group may be subsidized by the naive group, as Della Vigna and Malmendier show.
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may subliminally make the purchase,83 using the automatic decision-
making process of System 1.84 When a product is required for a
higher need of self-actualization, the deliberate process of System 2 is
more likely to be triggered.8 5 The more urgent our need, the less likely
we are to study the particular characteristics of our product choice and
read the accompanying disclosures.86 Consumer needs may determine
consumers' willingness to make the effort to carefully gather and ana-
lyze information.87 The violin player is likely to conduct thorough re-
search before she chooses her musical instrument artisan, but is less
likely to read information about the quality and nature of the electric-
ity she needs for heating her apartment. We rarely look into the infor-
mation on the chemical composition of liquids when we grab a glass of
water to quench our thirst, but we are more likely to ask about ingre-
dients and flavor when choosing a beer at our favorite local brewer.
(2) Failure of Supply
This bias in the demand side of the market is reflected in product
supply. Sellers know that consumers must purchase from their prod-
uct category. In markets of essential products, the demand and the
83. See generally Erin J. Strahan, Steven J. Spencer & Mark P. Zanna, Subliminal Priming and
Persuasion: Striking While the Iron is Hot, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 556, 556-68
(2002) (demonstrating that subliminally priming a goal-relevant cognition (thirst in Studies 1 and
2; sadness in Study 3) influenced behavior (in Study 1) and enhanced the persuasiveness of an ad
targeting the goal (in Studies 2 and 3) when people were motivated to pursue the goal (when
they were thirsty in Studies 1 and 2; when they expected to interact with another person in Study
3)). Put differently, the essential need for quenching one's thirst and the essential need for social
interaction impact the subliminal purchase decision.
84. Consumer decision-making is thus comprised of both systems: the fast, automatic, emo-
tional, and effortless "System 1," and the slow, deliberate, and controlled "System 2." Most
human behavior relies on "System 1" processing. According to empirical evidence, "'System 2'
overrides occur occasionally at best." See Roy F. Baumeister, Erin A. Sparks, Tyler F. Stillman &
Kathleen D. Vohs, Free Will in Consumer Behavior: Self-Control, Ego Depletion, and Choice, 18
J. CONSUMER PsYcHoL. 4, 7 (2008); see also John A. Bargh, The Automaticity of Everyday Life,
in THE AUTOMATICITY OF EVERYDAY LIFE: ADVANCES IN SOCIAL COGNITION (R.S. Wyer, Jr.
ed.,1997); see also John A. Bargh and Tanya L.Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of Be-
ing, 54 AM. PSYCHOL. 462, 476 (1999); see also John A. Bargh, Losing Consciousness: Automatic
Influences on Consumer Judgment, Behavior and Motivation, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 280, 280-82
(2002); see also Ap Dijksterhuis, Pamela K. Smith, Rick B. van Baaren & Daniel H. J.
Wigboldus, The Unconscious Consumer: Effects of Environment on Consumer Behavior, 15 J.
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 193, 194 (2005).
85. Dijksterhuis et al., The Unconscious Consumer: Effects of Environment on Consumer Be-
havior, 15 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 195, 198 (explaining that "[t]he vast majority of choices ...
are not the result of much information processing at all").
86. Suri & Monroe, supra note 81, at 100.
87. Consumers have physiological and emotional needs and nonconscious concerns and influ-
ences. See Bargh, supra note 84, at 282 (2002) (explaining that the motivation for the purchase of
goods may be subliminal wants and desires for "things" consumers "need to get done, or press-
ing concerns on their minds").
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size of the market tend to be constant. Electricity providers may cal-
culate the expected demand based on weather forecasts. Providers of
infant formula may be able to calculate expected market demand
based on the growth rate of the population. Given the rather constant
size of the market for essential products, sellers may compete within
the market on their respective market shares. Sellers of non-essential
products and sellers of luxuries, on the other hand, may have to com-
pete on their market shares in a constantly changing market size.
Consumers may enter and exit the non-essential product market.
To see why this characteristic of markets of essential products af-
fects the probability of market failure in the supply side, consider first
the incentive for collusion in markets of essential products versus the
incentive for collusion in non-essential markets. In a market of essen-
tial products, a monopoly or oligopoly may be able to charge exces-
sive prices; consumers are captive in the market and must purchase
the product category. Further, their purchase is motivated by an es-
sential need exogenous to the market price. Price is secondary to the
higher order value attained through purchase. On the other hand, in
non-essential markets, a monopoly or oligopoly charging excessive
prices typically leads to reduction in the size of the market. If the
seller increases the price, consumers may exit the market and shop at
a different market; non-essential products extend competition to dif-
ferent product categories. If the designer outfit for her baby is over-
priced, the consumer mother may shop for her baby at the develop-
ment toy store next door. Competition law literature shows that ex-
cessive prices will not necessarily invite entry of new providers and, in
many instances, excessive prices are likely to remain due to lack of
price competition among rivals.88 To the extent that the behavioral
market failure causes excessive pricing, competition will not aid in
making such excessive pricing self-correcting. 89
Essential needs-based consumption may be a case demonstrating
the boundaries of competition in amending behavioral market fail-
ures.90 Consider the incentives of sellers to compete in markets of
essential products versus markets of non-essential products. In mar-
kets of essential products, discounts given by one competitor would
increase its91 market share. But competitors are likely to respond
88. Ariel Ezrachi & David Gilo, Are Excessive Prices Really Self-Correcting?, 5 J. COMPETI-
TION LAw & ECON. 1, 8 (2009).
89. Id. at 2.
90. But see BAR-GILL, supra note 4, at 2.
91. Sellers in essential markets are rarely individuals. Mostly, these are multi-national corpo-
rations of considerable organizational scale.
2015] 27
28 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL
with price reductions of their own. Consumers would continue shop-
ping in similar quantities, determined by their exogenous essential
needs, and would be less responsive to the attractive price. Due to the
constant demand for quantities sold at the market, this scenario would
leave all competitors with smaller long-term revenues because the
scope of the proceeds attained from the same amount of units sold
would shrink. That is, a reduction in prices may increase seller A's
market share, but would reduce the whole pie of proceeds from the
market, given the rather constant amount of quantities consumed.
Foreseeing this equilibrium, sellers would be inclined to minimize
price competition in markets of essential products. On the other
hand, in markets of non-essential products, reduction in prices and a
price competition may result in bigger market size and a larger pie of
proceeds. Competition in non-essential markets is more likely to
reach the optimum point of marginal cost because it may benefit all
competitors to have lower pricing levels, as the market size may in-
crease as a result, thereby increasing all of their respective shares. Of
course, this analysis is a function of market size and, in very large
markets, competition on market segment may prove profitable
enough to create good incentives for price competition among sellers,
even with constant demand.
The incentives for investment in product quality are also smaller in
markets of essential products, compared to markets of non-essentials.
In markets of essential products, when consumers must make the
purchase promptly, consumers are less likely to be actively searching,
processing, and comparing product knowledge. In turn, consumers
are less likely to translate their product knowledge into product qual-
ity and finally into price.92 Without consumers' deliberate process of
product choice, sellers of higher quality products will not be able to
distinguish themselves from sellers of lower quality products, and low-
quality sellers will have incentives to hide their products' quality. 93
This scenario is typically called market for lemons, since the market
creates a race to the bottom on product quality. Specifically, no seller
has incentives to invest in higher quality products when higher quality
cannot translate into higher prices. In addition, sellers of essentials
have fewer incentives to invest in product quality compared with sell-
ers of non-essentials because their gain in improved quality is limited
92. See Suri & Monroe, supra note 81, at 92-93 (discussing the effect of time constraints on
demand).
93. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488-500 (1970) (explaining the quality of products and its
impact on consumer decision-making).
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to a larger market share of a constant market size, as consumers
purchase predetermined quantities according to exogenous interests.
In markets of non-essentials, on the other hand, improving quality
may increase the size of the market and bring more consumers to it, in
addition to increasing the sellers' share within that market. Invest-
ment in quality of non-essentials is likely to be more rewarding from
the sellers' perspective. This analysis is subject to market size. In very
large markets, a bigger market share may justify efforts in improving
quality despite the constant market size.
The following table summarizes why essentiality correlates with be-
havioral market failure and why markets of essential products tend
towards behavioral market failure more than markets of non-
essentials:
ESSENTIALITY AND BEHAVIORAL MARKET FAILURE
Non-Essential
Essential Products Products
Voluntariness Low High
Demand Side Likelihood of
Informed Choice
Incentives for High Low
Collusion
Likelihood of
Competition to Low HighSupply Side Reach Efficiency
Incentives for
Investment in Low High
Product Quality
PART II: WHAT'S ESSENTIAL?
How can regulators and lawmakers tell when a behavioral market
failure occurs? Which product choices are motivated by an essential
need? Indeed, which products are essential? Assessment of subjective
thoughts and feelings for the entire consumer public is an impossible
mission. This part of the essay explores two methods for determining
what is essential in the consumer market basket. The first is an objec-
tive-paternalistic measure of the requirements for a healthy life. The
second is composed of market data collected about the' consumption
patterns of products, which may signal bounded voluntariness of con-
sumers' product choices, increasing the probability of a behavioral
market failure affecting the product's demand.
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A. Objective Assessment: Services of General Interest
To assess what is essential for consumers' life, regulators and
lawmakers may use traditional political decision making processes,
with or without the professional guidance of public health scientists.
Policy makers may articulate a complete market basket for a full and
healthy human life, composing an objective list of requirements for
minimum living,94 including products required not only for healthy
nutrition, but also for fitness and recreation, housing, and social and
cultural integration. Articulation of essential products is a means of
evaluating minimum costs of living, and may also be used by policy
makers for the purpose of setting minimal wage and for poverty analy-
sis. For example, experts of public health policy proposed "consensual
dietary guidelines," recommending, among others, "no more than
35% of total dietary energy from fat; a polyunsaturated/saturated fat
ratio >0.45; <10% of dietary energy from non-intrinsic sugars; at
least five portions of fruit and vegetables (400 grams) excluding pota-
toes a day; and two portions of fish a week, one of them oily . . .. [i]n
addition [to] . . . dietary reference values for major vitamins and min-
erals." 95 Studies of public health policy provide "consensual evi-
dence" defining the major personal requisites for health in nutrition,
physical activity, and psychological relations. 96
One prominent example for objective assessment of essential prod-
ucts is the European doctrine of Services of General Interest. Euro-
pean law classifies some services as services of general interest and, as
such, imposes on their providers specific public service obligations as
well as optional state aid for requisite finance.97 Of particular interest
in this essay are the services of general economic interest (SGEI).
These are economic activities that deliver outcomes in the overall
public good that would or would not be supplied by the market with-
out public intervention under different conditions in terms of objec-
tive quality, safety, affordability, equal treatment, or universal
94. See, e.g., J. N. Morris et al., A Minimum Income for Healthy Living, 54 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY
& COMMUNITY HEALTH 885 (2000) (using an objective public health approach to identify repre-
sentative minimal costs per week in the U.K.) Specifically, the authors use research that provides
consensual evidence that defines the major personal requisites for health in nutrition, physical
activity and psychological relations, estimating the minimal costs and comparing them to the
statutory minimum wages.
95. Id. at 886.
96. Id. at 887.
97. Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 106 (2)
2007, O.J. (C 115), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eullegal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:1201
2E/TXT.
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access.98 Rather than seeking plain market functioning and restricting
regulation to instances of an economic market failure, European law
imposes a normative evaluation of market outcomes to justify regula-
tory intervention. Article 14 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) into the Lisbon Treaty and annexed to the
Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU) provide six values that must be applied
to all Services of General Economic Interest across the European
Union: a high level of quality, safety, affordability, equal treatment,
the promotion of universal access, and the promotion of human
rights.99 In an opinion of the Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo
Colomer, the general conditions for the provision of services of gen-
eral economic interest was framed. It stated that these services should
be uninterrupted for the benefit of all consumers throughout the rele-
vant territory and available at uniform tariff rates that are affordable
and transparent. 0 0 Recognizing the boundaries of competition in
these general interest services, European law provides regulation that
seeks to guarantee the rights of inhabitants to access fundamental
goods and services at a specific normative level for each of the follow-
ing values:
* Quality: Quality objectives vary and are precise for each sec-
tor.101 Yet, a collection of various sources allows us to pick out
the reliability and continuity of services; the existence of mecha-
nisms of compensation in the event of the standard of services
being poor; user and consumer protection; sustainable develop-
ment, among others. 102
* Safety: Consumer protection of risks includes physical safety for
the provision of services as well as safety and reliability of net-
works and materials. 03 The European Commission considers
that in "some cases of services of general interest, public inter-
vention may be necessary to improve the security of supply, in
98. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, GREEN PAPER ON SERVICES OF GENERAL
INTEREST 15 (COM 2003) 270, available at http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/l1avrupa-birligi/
1_6_raporlar/l_2_greenpapers/ corn 2003-green-paperon services_oftgeneral interest.pdf.
99. EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT TRADE UNIONS, PROVIDING HIGH-QUAL-
ITY PUBLIC SERVICES IN EUROPE BASED ON THE VALUES OF PROTOCOL 26 TFEU 6 (Study
Short Version 2012) (presenting the core results of a study by Pierre Bauby and Mihaela M.
Similie).
100. Id. at 1[ 54-56.
101. See 1997 O.J. (L 15) 22; see also GREEN PAPER ON SERVICES OF GENERAL INTEREST,
supra note 98, at 6.
102. GREEN PAPER ON SERVICES OF GENERAL INTEREST, supra note 98, at 6.
103. Id. at 18-19.
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particular in order to address the risk of long-term under-invest-
ment in infrastructure and to guarantee the availability of suffi-
cient capacity." 104
* Affordability: 105 Affordability is relative to the economic and so-
cial conditions of each territory as well as to needs and technolo-
gies. Thus, it varies from one location to another and evolves
over time.106 European law provides the possibility of compen-
sating the costs incurred in order to achieve the normative tasks
of affordability and accessibility. 07
* Equal Treatment: The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU
was adopted in 2000 and has been binding since the entry into
force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 It contains a spe-
cific title (Title III) on equality, which bans any form of
discrimination.
* Promoting Universal Access: European law acknowledges a fun-
damental right of access to services of general economic inter-
est.108 Acknowledging the market cannot provide universal
access or total geographical coverage, community action aims to
guarantee the universal access to Services of General Economic
Interest, in particular in the field of trans-European networks for
transport, energy, and telecommunication.1 09
* Promoting Human Rights: Services of General Economic Interest
are a subset of the larger category of Services of General Interest.
No definition has been given by any EU institution as to the ac-
104. Id. at 20.
105. Affordability as a requirement of services of general interest is supported by numerous
policy documents. See, e.g., GREEN PAPER ON SERVICES OF GENERAL INTEREST, supra note 98,
at 15, 18; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions: A Quality Framework
for Services of General Interest in Europe, at 3-4, COM (2011) 900 final (Dec. 20, 2011); Com-
munication from the Commission: Services of General Interest in Europe, at 1, COM (1996) 443
final (Nov. 9, 1996).
106. GREEN PAPER ON SERVICES OF GENERAL INTEREST, supra note 98, at 7-8.
107. "[T]he Union and the Member States ... shall take care that such services operate on the
basis of principles and conditions, particularly economic and financial conditions, which enable
them to fulfill their missions." TFEU art. 14. Application of Article 14 is without prejudice to
Articles 93, 106, and 107 of TFEU, which establish the role of the European Commission in
control of state aid and the conditions under which derogations from application of this control
may be granted to Service of General Interest. TFEU art. 14; Communication from the Commis-
sion to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of Regions: A Quality Framework for Services of General Interest in Europe, at 5
n.9, COM (2011) 900 final (Dec. 20, 2011).
108. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 36, 2012 O.J. (C 326/02) 391,
at 403.
109. PROVIDING HIGH-QUALITY PUBLIC SERVICES IN EUROPE BASED ON THE VALUES OF
PROTOCOL 26 TFEU 6, supra note 99, at 8 n.10.
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tual coverage of Services of General Interest.11 0 The Court of
Justice for the European Union has accepted various services as
such, including the distribution of water, gas, and electricity,
countrywide collection and delivery of mail, the operation of un-
profitable airlines, ambulance transport, and the pharmaceuticals
wholesale business.' In addition, the Commission has issued a
recommendation on access to basic banking services.1 12 Yet, pub-
lic authorities in the European member states have considerable
discretion when it comes to defining what they regard as services
of general economic interest1 3 and no theory provides guidelines
for classification of products and services as such. This applies
only in sectors that have been harmonized at the European
Union level and where objectives of general interest have been
taken into account.11 4 The member states' discretion, however,
cannot contradict the rules governing such harmonization."15
Member states have discretion in defining additional services as
services of general economic interest, subject to EU control for
manifest error.116
Using the political decision-making process for determining the
scope of essentiality indirectly reflects public opinion because the rep-
resentatives are elected by the public." 7 However, consumers' needs
may deviate from the politically-recommended requirements for life.
Consumers may feel they need other products. A need is an individ-
110. PANAGIOTIS DELIMATSIS, SERVIES OF GENERAL INTEREST AND THE EU EXTERNAL EN-
ERGY POLICY 3 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2375588.
111. Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Administrativo Regionale della
Lombardia Italy, Advisory Opinion, 2010 E.C.R. 1-03377, 3395 (Oct. 20, 2009).
112. See generally, Commission Recommendation on Access to a Basic Payment Account, at 3-
4, C (2011) 4977 final (July 18, 2011).
113. Communication Implementing the Community Lisbon Programme: Social Services of
General Interest in the European Union, at 3, COM (2006) 177 final (Apr. 26, 2006).
114. Case C-206/98 Comm'n v. Belgium, 2000 E.C.R. 1-3509, T 45.
115. For example, telecommunications and the postal and energy sectors have been harmo-
nized at Union level. See Directive 2002/22/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 7 March 2002 on Universal Service and Users' Rights Relating to Electronic Communications
Networks and Services (Universal Service Directive), 2002 O.J. (L 108) 51, 51, 58-59 (amended
by Directive 2009/136/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11); Directive 97/67/EC, of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on Common Rules for the Development of the
Internal Market of Community Postal Services and the Improvement of Quality of Service, 1998
O.J. (L 15) 14, 17-18 (amended by Directive 2002/39/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 176) 21; Directive 2008/06/
EC, 2008 O.J. (L 52) 3); Directive 2009/72/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
13 July 2009 Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity and Repealing
Directive 2003/54/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 211) 55, 59.
116. Case T-17/02, Fred Olsen, SA v. Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 11-2031, 1 216; Case T-289/03,
British United Provident Ass'n (BUPA) v. Comm'n, 2008 E.C.R. 11-81, 162, ¶ 165.
117. Citizens are a part of the larger consumer public.
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ual, subjective feeling: "what is a luxury to some may seem an outright
necessity to others."118 Applying an objective measurement of essen-
tiality is using a paternalistic approach to consumer protection laws,
which is rooted in the realm of private law.
B. Assessment of Essentiality Based on Market Data
Market-based indicators reflecting a particular public's consump-
tion patterns in a particular place and time may make a better founda-
tion for a normative definition of essential needs since they are based
on actual consumer preferences in the local market of a particular cul-
ture.119 Using market data for assessment of product essentiality is
culture-neutral and may be applied to any consumer product market
with different outcomes, according to the actual patterns of consump-
tion in the culture examined.
In the following, the essay suggests assessment of product essential-
ity using data that document market-level elasticity of demand for
popular products. Lower market-level elasticity of demand suggests
weaker consumer responsiveness to products' prices. Product popu-
larity is measured using the statistical market basket that determines
the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which is based on statistical analysis
of expenditure surveys, suggesting that the product is consumed
widely by the public. When a product category shows both inelasticity
and high popularity, this product category is likely to be purchased
under a feeling of necessity by a large consumer public, thereby creat-
ing increased likelihood for a behavioral market failure. These prod-
ucts may be considered "essential."
(1) Market-level Elasticity of Demand
Demand is a representation of consumer preferences, expressed in
terms of quantities purchased at different prices. 120 Demand curves
are frequently used in microeconomics analysis, usually under Alfred
Marshall's convention, indicating for a product or a group of products
the quantity that will be purchased at each price, holding constant the
118. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
119. Consider the words of Amartya Sen: "People have been known to survive with incredibly
little nutrition .... There is difficulty in drawing a line somewhere, and the so-called 'minimum
nutritional requirements' have an inherent arbitrariness that goes well beyond variations be-
tween groups and regions." AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLE-
MENT AND DEPRIVATION 12 (1982).
120. Gregory J. Werden, Demand Elasticities in Antitrust Analysis, 66 ANTITRUST L. J. 363,
364 n.6 (1998) ("The first expression of a demand curve as a mathematical expression is credited
to Pietro Verri in his 1760 Elementi del Commercio. See DONALD W. KATZNER, STATIC DEMAND
THEORY 7 (1970); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 307 n.13 (1954)").
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prices of all other products, nominal income, and consumer tastes.1 21
The Law of Demand introduced by Marshall is a description of con-
sumers' sensitivity to prices, stating that the higher the product's price,
the lesser the quantity that will be purchased.1 22 Elasticity of demand,
originally termed own-price elasticity of demand, indicates the respon-
siveness of quantities demanded to changes in price.123 Specifically,
elasticity of demand is the proportionate change in quantities de-
manded divided by the proportionate change in price that induced the
quantities change. Put otherwise: The Price Elasticity of Demand is
"the percentage change in quantity demanded divided by the percent-
age change in price."1 24 Its formal definition is simple, where elastic-
ity of demand is:
Percentage change in Quantity Demanded
En =
Percentage change in Price
The assumption underlying free markets is that consumers will re-
spond to increases in price by changing their consumption patterns
and lowering the quantities consumed.1 25 Price sensitivity is assumed
as a characteristic of all consumers. Elasticity of demand is thus a
measure of consumer responsiveness.1 2 6 For example, when elasticity
of demand is high, a low percentage of change in price triggers a high
percentage of change in quantities consumed. And vice versa: When
121. Id. at 364 nn.7 & 9 (citing ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, ch. 3-4, reset
and reprinted in 1949 (8th ed. 1920); Milton Friedman, The Marshallian Demand Curve, 57 J.
POL. ECON. 463, 463 (1949), reprinted in MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 47
(1953)).
122. Id. at 364.
123. Id. at 364-65 (citing George Stigler, The Nature and Role of Originality in Scientific Pro-
gress, 22 ECONOMICA 293, 293 (1955); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALY-
sis 307, 992 (1954)).
124. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MICROECONOMICs 58 (15th ed. 1989).
125. Recall Adam Smith's invisible hand: each consumer is freely choosing what to buy and
each seller is freely choosing what to sell, and the market will settle on a product distribution and
prices that are beneficial to all members of a community and to the community as a whole. In
other words, Smith argues that self-interest drives actors to beneficial behavior. Efficient meth-
ods of production are adopted to maximize profits. The market is a dynamic and automatic, self-
sufficient process, driven by self interest alone. In Smith's own words: "it is not from the benevo-
lence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to
their own self interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and
never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages." See generally, Adam Smith,
An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, in 36 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 1, 8 (Mortimer J. Adler ed., 2d ed. 1990). At least some scholars define the
market as an arena of exchanges, where buyers and sellers of various goods meet repeatedly
over time to perform diverse exchanges. See NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE MAR-
KETs 30 (2001).
126. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 124, at 58.
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elasticity of demand is low, a significant change in price triggers a
meager change in quantities consumed, and consumers keep buying
similar quantities despite the higher prices. Price is elastic when a
given percent of change in price triggers a greater change in quantity
consumed. Price is inelastic when a given change in price yields a
smaller change in quantity consumed. Consumer demand is unit elas-
tic when the percentage of change in consumed products is exactly the
same as the percentage of change in price. Demand is elastic if elastic-
ity exceeds one; demand is inelastic if less than one; demand is said to
be unit elastic if elasticity is one exactly.1 27
Scholars of Economics use various methods for assessment of elas-
ticity. As most products and commodities are not homogeneous, but
rather are product categories comprised of a collection of various
kinds of products that are distinguished in quality and in origin, con-
sumers may respond to price alterations with amendment to quality of
various brands within the product category, with no (or little) amend-
ment to quantity consumed in the category as a whole. For example,
should the price of beef increase, in search of protein, consumers may
alter their choices within the meat category, and prefer chicken,1 28
without altering the total amount of meat purchased. Even within the
beef category, there are various slices with a wide array of flavors and
nutritional value.129 "Houthakker and Prais thus suggest several esti-
mates of "elasticity of quality," which is the elasticity of unit value
with respect to total household expenditure (or income)."o3 0 In addi-
tion, prices need to be assessed with respect to their actual effect on
consumption, including taking into account the economies of scale of
larger households. 131 Methodology for assessment of elasticity re-
quires attention to the specific product market and its characteristics.
Elasticity is highly related to market power. A monopolist supply-
ing a product with neither perfect nor close substitutes may be able to
increase prices with reasonable resilience to consumers' response and
reduced consumption. The proportionate amount in which a monopo-
list would raise prices above marginal cost is determined by the elas-
ticity of the demand curve the monopolist faces.1 32 In contrast, the
127. Werden, supra note 120, at 366.
128. Angus Deaton, Quality, Quantity, and Spatial Variation of Price, 78 AM. ECON. REV.,
418, 420 (1988).
129. Deaton, supra note 131, at 420.
130. Id. at 420 (citing J.S. Cramer, Interactions of Income and Price in Consumer Demand, 14
INT'L ECON. REV. 351, 353 (1973)).
131. See ANGUS DEATON, THE ANALYSIS OF HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS: A MICROECONOMETRIC
APPROACH To DEVELOPMENT POLICY 77 (1997).
132. Werden, supra note 120, at 369 (showing a profit maximization formula by a monopolist).
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competitive firm faces an infinitely elastic demand curve through the
relevant range, and thus the competitive marginal price equals margi-
nal cost.1 3 3
Assessment of demand elasticities is commonly used by economists
as evidence of market power.1 34 Antitrust literature defines "market
power" as the ability to raise prices by restricting output,1 35 the ability
to profitably maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant
period of time 3 6 or the ability to raise prices above the competitive
level without losing so many sales that the price increase is unprofita-
ble and becomes rescinded.' 37 Abba Lerner proposed to measure the
"degree of monopoly power" by:
P
Denoting marginal cost by c and marginal revenue by p.1 38 This equa-
tion, known as the "Lerner index," shows that market power is closely
related to elasticity of demand faced by the firm.' 39
Elasticity is thus highly significant for antitrust scrutiny. Antitrust
laws define market power as "the ability of a single seller to raise price
and restrict output,"1 40 So that "prices can be raised above the levels
that would be charged in a competitive market,"141 but the antitrust
scrutiny usually comes into effect when market power is sufficient to
allow a firm to earn more than just a competitive return on invest-
ment. That is, to earn monopoly profits.1 42 Monopoly power is de-
fined under the antitrust convention as "a high degree of market
power,"1 43 a degree of market power sufficient to cause a profit-maxi-
mizing firm to price in excess of long-run marginal cost.1 4 4 The mea-
133. Id. at 370.
134. Id. at 380.
135. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUST LAW 86 (Little, Brown and Co. 4th
ed. 1995).
136. Werden, supra note 120, at 370 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE
Comm., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 0.1 (1992), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,104.
137. William Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L.
REV. 937, 939 (1981).
138. Abba P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1
REV. ECON. STUD. 157, 169 (1934).
139. Werden, supra note 120, at 372.
140. Fortner Enters v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969).
141. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 n.46 (1984).
142. Werden, supra note 120, at 370.
143. Landes & Posner, supra note 137, at 937
144. Werden, supra note 120, at 373.
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sure of monopoly power is the Lerner Index, but with long-run
marginal cost used in place of short-run marginal cost.145 In the Cello-
phane case, the Supreme Court defined the term "Monopoly power"
as "the power to control prices or exclude competition."1 46 In Anti-
trust law, a "monopoly means an excessive degree of market control,
whether viewed in terms of power to fix prices or power to exclude
rivals from the market, or both."1 4 7 In the words of the Supreme
Court, "what constrains [a] defendant's ability to raise prices . .. is the
elasticity of demand faced by the defendant - the degree to which its
sales fall . . . as its price rises."1 4 8 For example, in its antitrust proceed-
ings, Kodak argued that the geographic scope of the relevant market
was the entire world, and that the estimated demand elasticities be-
tween Kodak and Fuji are as high, so that "if Kodak were to raise its
price by five percent, it would lose ten percent of sales."1 49 The court
held that "Price elasticities are better measures of market power [than
market shares],"' 5 0 accepting Kodak's economist expert opinion and
reasoning that the high elasticity resulted in a lack of market power.' 5 '
When supply and demand were not particularly elastic, an agreement
among firms accounting for a substantial share of the relevant market
could reduce supply and raise prices.1 52
Elasticity may also be used as a market signal of essentiality, as it is
highly correlated with the determinants of essentiality discussed
above. Low elasticity is a signal of bounded voluntariness. When
elasticity is zero, consumers are indifferent to price, and are willing to
pay anything in order to get hold of the product. In real life, elasticity
is never zero, because consumers have limited resources. Low elastic-
ity signals that consumers are eager to obtain the product. When elas-
ticity is low, and consumers fail to respond to prices, their adherence
to the purchase of the product suggests a stiffness of consumer moti-
vation -that something limits their ability to avoid purchase and seek
145. Id. at 373.
146. United States v. E. I du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
147. Phil C. Neal, The Clayton Act and the Transamerica Case, 5 STAN. L. REv. 179, 213-14
(1953).
148. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469 n. 15 (1992) (quot-
ing PHILIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 576 (4th ed. 1988)).
149. United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 853 F. Supp. 1454, 1473 (W.D.N.Y. 1994), affd,
United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F. 3d 95 (2nd Cir. 1995).
150. Id. at 1472.
151. Id. at 1473; see Eastman, 63 F. 3d at 108 (The Court of Appeals accepted the elasticity
evidence as well).
152. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMM., ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDE-
LINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (April 1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/internat.htm.
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substitutes or alter their choice. According to the textbook of
MicroEconomics for "necessities like food, fuel, shoes, and prescrip-
tion drugs demand tends to be inelastic, such items are stuff of life and
cannot easily be foregone when prices rise. By contrast, you can sub-
stitute other goods when luxuries like European holidays, 17 year old
scotch whiskey and Italian designer clothing rise in price."153
Demand tends to be more elastic when there are substitutes for a
product and less elastic when the product has few or less satisfactory
substitutes. 154 Consider the demand for a particular brand of salt: one
brand of salt is "a more-or-less perfect substitute to any other," so
demand is expected to be highly elastic.15 5 Substitution can be af-
fected by the properties of the product or by consumer motivation: for
example, demand for airline travel for leisure is price elastic (-1.52),
because leisure travelers may have reasonably good alternatives for
air travel, whereas business travelers are naturally more time-sensitive
and thus perceive the alternative automobile transport as more expen-
sive, resulting in a lower elasticity of demand (-1.15).156
Elasticity is also signaling the difficulty to defer purchase of a prod-
uct, discussed above as the third determinant of essentiality. Time
constraints are also of essence in the assessment of elasticities of de-
mand.157 If oil prices increase, consumers may not be able to drive
less in the short run because many of the car trips cannot be aban-
doned or altered: for example, consumers need to keep going to
work. 5 Relocating closer to work, or trading to a more efficient car
with better gas mileage are longer term moves, whereas in the short-
run, consumers would be bound to keep purchasing fuel despite the
higher prices.1 59 As a result, "the demand for gasoline will be much
more elastic in the long run than in the short run."1 60 Similar effects
may be traced every time consumers are bound by high switching
costs. In the short-run, consumers are captive and must keep purchas-
ing despite the higher prices, but in the long-run, they may be able to
replace providers: natural gas for households has meager short-term
153. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MICRoEcONoMics 58 (McGraw-Hill,
15th ed. 1998).
154. DAVID BESANKO & RONALD R. BRAEUTIGAM, MICROECONOMIcs: AN INTEGRATED AP-
PROACH 53 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2002).
155. ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR, 119 (McGraw-Hill, 7th ed.
2008).
156. BESANKO & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 154, at 53.
157. FRANK, supra note 155, at 119.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (See figure 4.26 for an analysis of the short term vs. long term equilibrium).
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elasticity documented (-0.1), yet, "a whopping" (-10.7) in the long-
run.1 61
For the purpose of assessment of essentiality, the important heuris-
tic should be the market-level elasticity rather than the brand-level
elasticity. For example, demand for individual models of automobiles
is highly elastic (between -3.5 and -6.5), yet the market-level price
elasticity of demand for automobiles generally falls between -1 and
1.5, and is considerably less elastic.1 62 Consumers feel they need a car
but are less sensitive to its particular model.163 If the price of any
particular car model went up, consumers would switch to the now
lower-priced models, but would keep purchasing products at the auto-
mobiles market.164 While demand can be inelastic at the market level,
it can be highly elastic at the individual brand level. 165 Essentiality is a
characteristic of product categories rather than particular brands. If
one of the brands raises its price, consumers may alter their choices
and purchase a competing brand, but they must get some brand of the
essential category, making the market inelastic, and essential.
The following is a table summarizing the relation between elasticity,
competition and essentiality:
Essentiality
Low High
High Elastic* Elastic*Elastict Inelastict
Competition Elastic* Inelastic*
Elastict Inelastict
* Brand-level price elasticity
t Market-level price elasticity
Low elasticity documented at the market-level is a signal of cultural
perception of subjective need: low market-level elasticity suggests
many consumers feel they need the product category regardless of its
price: consumers are captive within the market for the generic prod-
uct. An assessment of the degree of market-level elasticity of demand
may be used as a means to detect which products are purchased with
essential needs-based motivation. Consumers' responsiveness to price
at the market-level may be a market indicator for subjective feelings
161. Id. at 120.
162. BESANKO & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 154, at 54-55.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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of the public regarding the necessity of purchase within that particular
market. For popular products, a public conception of luxuries would
reflect in higher market-level elasticity of demand, whereas a public
perception of necessities would reflect in lower elasticity of demand,
signaling that the product is more likely to be purchased under condi-
tions of a behavioral market failure. 166
Empirical evidence strengthens this hypothesis about the structure
of consumer demand, and suggests low elasticity may signal bounded
voluntariness, which correlates with a behavioral market failure. Con-
sumers show less responsiveness to price when they subjectively assign
a product as needed. For example, elasticity of water usage decreases
in the summer months as all users are less responsive to price changes
when seasonal needs require water usage for outdoor uses (vegetation
and swimming pools).1 67 Reductions in precipitation lead to increases
in water use and reductions in the number of days of precipitation
reduce water usage for both seasons. 168 Fuel, which is essential for
transportation, shows to have very low elasticity of demand. The liter-
ature on the price elasticity of gasoline demand shows that the aver-
age short-run elasticity is -0.09, and the average long-run elasticity is -
0.31.169 Bus rides also score very low demand elasticities, with rides to
work most inelastic (-0.1 to -0.19), scoring almost half the elasticity of
the average recorded elasticity for transit for general purposes (-0.22
to -0.33) and less than half elasticity of demand for rides for shopping
trip purposes (-0.32 to -0.49).170 Consumers just have to get to work,
and elasticity is lower, whereas they may defer shopping or travel to
the outlets by other means. Demand for health care is consistently
found to be price inelastic.171 Although the range of price elasticity
166. See BAR-GILL, supra note 4, at 2; ANGUS DEATON & JOHN MUELLBAUER, ECONOMICS
AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 19 (1980) (suggesting that this would apply to popular products
only, as luxuries consumed only by the very wealthy are expected to show lower elasticity due to
widening wealth gaps and the rational indifference to costs at this social segment).
167. H. Allen Klaiber, V. Kerry Smith, Michael Kaminsky, & Aaron Strong, Estimating the
Price Elasticity of Demand for Water with Quasi Experimental Methods 14 (Agric. and Applied
Econ. Ass'n, Paper No. 10260, 2010), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edulbitstreami/61039/
2/010260.pdf.
168. Id. at 13.
169. Tomas Havranek, Zuzana Irsova, & Karel Janda, Demand for Gasoline is More Price-
Inelastic than Commonly Thought, 34 ENERGY ECONOMICS 201, 205-06 (2012), available at http://
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/ S0140988311002040.
170. Todd Litman, Transit Price Elasticities and Cross Elasticities, 7 J. PUB. TRANSP., 37, 46
(2004), available at www.nctr.usf.edu/jpt/pdflJPT%207-2%20Litman.pdf.
171. Jeanne S. Ringel, Susan D. Hosek, Ben A. Vollaard & Sergej Mahnovski, The Elasticity
of Demand for Health Care: A Review of the Literature and Its Application to the Military Health
System (2005), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph-reports/20
05/MR1355.pdf.
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estimates is relatively wide, it tends to center on -0.17, meaning that a
1 percent increase in the price of health care will lead to a 0.17 percent
reduction in health care expenditures.1 7 2 Social integration needs and
cultural differences are also reflected in the elasticity of demand. For
example, broadband demand is relatively elastic to price in Latin
America and the Caribbean, but not in the OECD, where Internet
connectivity is an established means of social communication.1 73
Much additional empirical research is required in order to establish
correlativity between automatic decision-making, needs-based con-
sumer motivation and elasticity of demand. From a normative per-
spective, we may use the existing evidence as a signal of guidance
towards better policy of consumer protection. We know that consum-
ers have different consumption motivations. When consumption mo-
tivation is essentially needs-based, consumers feel the purchase of a
product is necessary. If consumers feel they cannot afford to live
without a product, consumers are likely to be less price-sensitive, and
thus elasticity of demand is recorded as lower. Elasticity of demand
recorded on popular products used by most of the public may thus
serve as a market based heuristic for the subjective feeling of essential
necessity shared by many consumers in a given market.1 74
(2) Product Popularity
Low market-level elasticity serves as a good signal for essential
products, but it is not sufficiently narrow to create a sound definition
to be used by regulators. Widening wealth gaps due to inequalities of
172. The price-induced changes in demand for health care can in large part be attributed to
changes in the probability of accessing any care rather than to changes in the number of visits
once care has been accessed. In addition, the studies consistently find lower levels of demand
elasticity at lower levels of cost-sharing. The demand for health is also found to be income
inelastic. The estimates of income elasticity of demand are in the range of 0 to 0.2. The positive
sign of the elasticity measure indicates that as income increases, the demand for health care
services also increases. The magnitude of the elasticity, however, suggests that the demand re-
sponse is relatively small.
173. Broadband demand is relatively inelastic in mature markets and relatively elastic in
emerging markets. In this study elasticity of demand in Latin America and the Caribbean was
documented at -2.20 while the OECD is at -0.36. Hernan Galperin & Christian A. Ruzzier, Price
Elasticity of Demand for Broadband: Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean, 37
TELECOMM. POL'Y 429, 430, 435 (2013) (citing Koutsky T., Ford G.& L. Spiwak, The Broadband
Performance Index: A Policy Relevant Method for Comparing Broadband Adoption Among
Countries, PHOENIX CENTER POLICY PAPER, July 2007, http://www.phoenix-center.org/pcpp/
PCPP29Final.pdf; H. Marcedo & A.D. Carvelho, Broadband Economic Impact in Brazil: A Si-
multaneous Economic Analysis, Presented at the 5th Acorn Redecom Conference, Lima, Peru
(Nov. 19, 2011)).
174. Popularity is a requisite complementary test. Due to widening wealth gaps, luxuries used
by the very wealthy may reflect inelastic demand as their costs are meager to the very large
pockets of their consumers. See discussion infra Part III.
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income from labor and capital may create distortions. 175 The very
wealthy consumers may be less responsive to prices of luxuries, be-
cause the gap between their resources and the costs blurs the differ-
ence, and is indeed insignificant for their pockets. Thus, market-level
elasticity may signal essentiality only in popular markets, purchased
by most of the public. Because consumers tend to make more mindful
choices and better research alternatives for their big purchases, the
larger the share of expenditures accounted for by a product compared
to the consumer's budget, the higher the expected elasticity would be,
and vice versa: the smaller the share of the total expenditure ac-
counted for by a good, compared to the consumer's budget, the less
elastic demand will be.1 76
For this reason, essentiality may be assessed by low market-level
elasticity for documented for popular products on product's popular-
ity. In order to be considered essential, a product has to be commonly
purchased. A framework fitting for the popularity test requirement
may be the CPI: the Consumer Price Index, which measures changes
in costs for a representative market basket, developed based on statis-
tical analysis of detailed expenditure information provided by families
and individuals on what they actually bought. Statistical analysis is
performed on expenditures data coming from thousands of diaries and
interviews, to determine the importance and statistical weight of vari-
ous consumer products. For the current CPI, this information was col-
lected from the Consumer Expenditure Surveys for 2011 and 2012.177
The CPI is measured for two reference populations, all urban consum-
ers and urban wage earners and clerical workers. The all-urban con-
sumer group represents about 87 percent of the total U.S.
population.1 78 It is based on the expenditures of spending patterns of
the population as follows: people living in rural nonmetropolitan ar-
eas, farm families, people in the Armed Forces, and those in institu-
tions, such as prisons and mental hospitals; almost all residents of
urban or metropolitan areas, including professionals, the self-em-
ployed, the poor, the unemployed, and retired people; as well as urban
wage earners and clerical workers.
175. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 336 (Translated by Arthur
Goldhammer, 2014).
176. BESANKO & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 154, at 53; FRANK, supra note 155, at 119.
177. In each of 2011 and 2012, about 7,000 families from around the country provided infor-
mation each quarter on their spending habits in the interview survey. To collect information on
frequently purchased items, such as food and personal care products, another 7,000 families in
each of these years kept diaries listing everything they bought during a 2-week period. Bureau
of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/cpi.
178. http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpifaq.htm.
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The CPI includes more than 200 items divided into eight categories:
(1) FOOD AND BEVERAGES (breakfast cereal, milk, coffee,
chicken, wine, full service meals, snacks); (2) HOUSING (rent of pri-
mary residence, owners' equivalent rent, fuel oil, bedroom furniture);
(3) APPAREL (men's shirts and sweaters, women's dresses, jewelry);
(4) TRANSPORTATION (new vehicles, airline fares, gasoline, motor
vehicle insurance); (5) MEDICAL CARE (prescription drugs and
medical supplies, physicians' services, eyeglasses and eye care, hospi-
tal services); (6) RECREATION (televisions, toys, pets and pet prod-
ucts, sports equipment, admissions); (7) EDUCATION AND
COMMUNICATION (college tuition, postage, telephone services,
computer software and accessories); (8) OTHER GOODS AND
SERVICES (tobacco and smoking products, haircuts and other per-
sonal services, funeral expenses).
The Bureau thus chooses specific items within stores and businesses
frequented by consumers to assess their cost. Reflecting the public's
consumption patterns, this statistically measured market basket
should be the framework for the third popularity test.
Notably, essentiality - whether established on objective-paternalis-
tic grounds, or documented through the market heuristics suggested
above - is not an immediate cause of normative action, and some reg-
ulatory discretion is required before tailoring the appropriate policy.
The additional discretion is required due to the normative dimension
of essentiality. For example, cigarettes have documented low market-
level elasticity,179 and may indeed be popular in some cultures. Yet,
our cultural ethos of personhood assumes human discretion in smok-
ing, and declaring cigarettes 'essential' would be culturally
inappropriate. 180
PART III: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The category of essential products, increasing the likelihood and the
magnitude of a behavioral market failure, implies that consumer law
should be structured with a hierarchy of rights, similar to constitu-
tional or international human rights laws.181 Sunstein sketches a con-
179. The estimated market-level elasticity for cigarettes is -0.107; when the price of all the
individuals brands of cigarettes go up, overall demand for cigarettes is not likely to be affected
very much.
180. Declaring cigarettes essential may also be economically inefficient, as essentiality may
create incentives to smoke, rather than quit smoking. BESANKO & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note
154, at 52.
181. Minimum essential levels of rights to food, health, housing and education reflect a "mini-
malist" rights strategy recognized by the United Nations and adopted by several regimes world-
wide. Joshua Cohen, Minimilaism about Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?, 12 J. POL.
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tinuum of paternalism, with "hard" paternalism signifying higher costs
imposed "on choosers", and "soft paternalism" referring to govern-
mental actions imposed to influence welfare "without imposing mate-
rial costs on choosers."1 82  In this "continuum" of paternalism,
essential products are likely to justify "hardest" points, whereas non-
essentials may be regulated with softer intervening approaches.183
The underlying values of essential consumption and bounded volunta-
riness require a greater degree of protection compared with non-es-
sential consumption. Because consumers of essentials are particularly
vulnerable, and due to the moral significance of essential consump-
tion, and to the tendency of essential markets to create a behavioral
market failure, regulators should consider implying the normative
minimal rights provided for by their state into regulation of essentials.
Such "hard" paternalism may be exercised, for example, through price
regulation or subsidies creating public accessibility to products that
are requisite for human rights. The continuum of paternalism echoes
the continuum of product essentiality in a variety of consumer protec-
tion regulations. This continuum also applies to antitrust policy: as
monopolist supply is more harmful in markets for essential products,
and competition might be less robust in essential markets,1 84 greater
scrutiny of essential product markets by the antitrust authorities may
be required.
Assessment of essentiality is also of significance for policy makers.
In regimes applying price control policy, such paternalistic measures
should be adopted after reviewing empirical data about market-level
elasticity of demand. Using the elasticity data is subject to normative
assessment and should also be subject to hearing sellers' arguments
regarding competition and its vulnerability. Empirical evidence of
low market-level elasticity of demand is one consideration out of
many that should be taken into account. Documented low market-
level elasticity of demand should shift the burden, so that sellers
would be required to show competition is vibrant enough to secure
consumers' welfare despite low elasticity. Essentiality and bounded
PHIL. 190, 192 (2004); Brigit Toebes, The Right to Health, EcoNoMIc, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGITrrs: A TEXTBOOK 169, 176 (Asbjorn Eide, Catarina Krause and Allen Rosas eds., 2d ed.
2001). Constitutional protection is also typically given to an internal layer of rights distinguished
in hierarchy and ranked higher than other rights and interests. Karin Lehmann, In Defense of the
Constitutional Court: Litigating Economic and Social Rights and the Myth of the Minimum Core,
22 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 163, 192 (2006).
182. Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE
L.J. 1826, 1858-1861 (2013).
183. See id., Sunstein's discussion of the continuum.
184. See id. at 1868; see also infra Part III(A)(2).
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voluntariness have wide implications on contractual enforcement, and
may be taken into account by courts discussing enforcement of stan-
dardized forms and applying consumers' unconscionability doctrine.
Unconscionability, generally recognized as the absence of meaningful
choice, must be determined on a case-by-case basis, but courts' atten-
tion may be given to the essentiality of the underlying purchase as a
consideration in assessment of bounded voluntariness and of inequal-
ity of bargaining power.s85 Finally, the hierarchy of human needs, re-
flected in a hierarchy of consumption affects the purpose of consumer
law. Essentiality signals that autonomy cannot be meaningfully exer-
cised, and thus may not provide an independent underlying value for
consumer protection law, nor serve as a useful "heuristic" for con-
sumer welfare.1 86
IV. CONCLUSION
This essay offered a theory of essential products, suggesting a hier-
archy of consumer protection for consumption of essentials versus
consumption of non-essentials. The essay surveyed behavioral litera-
ture discussing human needs and the distinction between essentials
and luxuries, and suggested a pyramid of consumption following Mas-
low's hierarchy of needs. The essay identified three determinants of
essentiality, including a moral baseline of consumption; lack of good
substitutes and inability to decline purchase, and time constraints.
The continuum of essentiality was exemplified using four cases of con-
sumption, including electricity for heating, infant formula, broadband
services and a violin.
Essential needs-based consumption was shown to enhance the like-
lihood of a behavioral market failure, as consumers' decision-making
process is particularly vulnerable and inevitably distorts sellers' incen-
tives towards a sub optimal equilibrium. The essay argued that mar-
kets of essentials tend toward failure of demand, due to consumers'
bounded voluntariness and lower probability of informed choice. Ac-
cordingly, sellers in markets of essentials have higher incentives for
collusion and lower incentives for price competition and for invest-
ment in product quality. The more basic the underlying need, the
higher the likelihood of market failure.
The difficulty of regulators to tell what's essential was addressed.
The essay suggested two methods for assessment of essentiality, the
185. JOHN P. DAWSON, WILLIAM BURNETT HARVEY, STANLEY D. HENDERSON, CONTRACTS:
CASES AND COMMENT 695 (9th edition 2008).
186. Sunstein, supra note 182, at 1886.
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first, through political assessment, and the second, through analysis of
market data documenting elasticity of demand for popular product
categories. Low elasticity of demand for popular product categories
was sketched as a market signal for consumers' bounded voluntariness
and for product essentiality.
The normative implications of this structural division of consump-
tion were discussed and policy guidelines were suggested. Essentiality
and its tendency to create a behavioral market failure implies that es-
sential products should be subject to a higher degree paternalism com-
pared with non-essentials, and regulators seeking to enhance
consumer welfare should treat markets of essentials with greater scru-
tiny compared with markets of non-essentials.

